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Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End 
Justify the Means? 
by 
A. Mechele Dic~erson* 
America is a country that believes in second chances. Consistent with 
this brief, bankruptcy laws historically have been used to give financially be-
leaguered debtors a second chance, a clean economic slate. Whether this sec-
ond chance continues to be warranted has been the subject of intense debate 
for the last few years. Under intense pressure by well-funded creditor lobby-
ing groups, 1 for the last three years Congress has considered legislation that 
would "'means test" bankruptcy relief.2 Making potential debtors satisfy a 
means test, critics argue, will ensure that bankruptcy relief is available only 
*Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. The paper benefitted tremendously by comments 
and criticisms I received from Professors Beverly Moran, Margaret Howard, and Peter Alces. This pro-
ject would not have been possible without the diligent and dedicated research assistance of Pia Thadhani, 
or without the help of Brian Holmen and Suzanne Courtney. This project was supported, in part, by a 
grant provided by the William and Mary Law School. 
1See World P{ews 'Tonight: Credit Card Companies Succeed in Lobbying Senate to Pass P{ew Ban~­
ruptcy Law Mal{ing it More Difficult for 'Those with Credit Card Debt to Claim Personal Ban~ptcy 
(ABC television broadcast, Mar. 15, 2001); P{ightline: Paying the Piper; P{ew Legislation Which is Ex-
pected to Pass Gets 'Tough on 'Those Who File for Ban~ptcy (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 14, 2001); 
Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001; Christopher H. 
Schmitt, 'Tougher Ban~ptcy Laws- Compliments ofMB'N_A?, Bus. WK., Feb. 26, 2001, at 43; Donald L. 
Barlett and James B. Steele, Big Money and Politics/Who Gets Hurt, TIME, May 15, 2000 at 64 (reporting 
lobbying costs of more than $5 million); Editorial, Bad Ideas on Ban~ptcy, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 2000, at 
A22 (noting that bankruptcy is in ~the spotlight~ due to ~some pricey lobbying by financial firmsr Russ 
Feingold, Lobbyists' Rush for Ban~ptcy Reform, WAsH. PosT., June 7, 1999, at A19 ("[C]redit card 
companies have spent tens of millions of dollars to push a bill that legal experts and judges say won't 
work.~); Dan Morgan, Creditors' Money 'Tal~s Louder in Ban~ptcy Debate: Consumer Groups Fight P{ew 
Curbs on Insolvent Debtors, WAsH. PosT, Jun. 1, 1999 at A04 (reporting critics' concern that the drive to 
overhaul bankruptcy laws presents ~a case study of the impact of money on the political process.~); Jacob 
M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Ban~ptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Harder Laws, WALL 
ST. J~ June 17, 1998, at A1 (reporting that credit trade group held a $1,000-a-head fundraiser for a chief 
proponent of bankruptcy reform). 
2See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H. R. 333, 107th Cong. 
(2001); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 107th Cong. (2000); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999); 
A Bill to Amend Title 11 of the U.S. Code to Modify the Application of Chapter 7 Relating to Liquida-
tion Cases, H.R. 333, 106th Cong. (1999); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. 
§ 101 (1998); Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998, H.R. 3146, 
105th Cong. § 8 (1998); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997); 
Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act of 1997; H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997). 
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to people who can document a quantifiable need for this economic relief.3 
Though means-testing bankruptcy relief is theoretically unobjectionable, 
crafting a workable means test is controversial and divisive.4 
Means-testing is theoretically sound because it is not irrational to en-
courage (if not force) debtors to accept the consequences of their fiscally irre-
sponsible behavior by making them attempt to repay debts within their 
means. Means testing is controversial and politically divisive because an ill-
conceived test potentially would discourage some deserving consumers from 
seeking formal debt relief and may ultimately prevent some needy consumers 
from discharging their debts.5 It also is controversial because it would au-
thorize the bankruptcy system (i.e., bankruptcy trustees and attorneys) to use 
bankruptcy relief to enforce social or moral expectations.6 
Until recently, means-testing proposals have had at best lukewarm legis-
lative support.7 Because of the dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings in the 
last ten to fifteen years, certain industry critics have convinced Congress that 
the goal of decreasing the number of consumer filings now justifies imposing a 
means test. Critics also suggest that reforms are needed because debtors now 
view the discharge as a guaranteed federal entitlement and view bankruptcy 
as a value-free nonstigmatiz;ing process. 
The Essay argues that the current push to means-test bankruptcy relief 
can be explained and justified by examining the recent shift in the public's 
3See infra notes 130·35. 
4This Essay assumes that at least some aspects of consumer bankruptcy relief will be means-tested or 
that, at a minimum, means-testing proposals will continue to be presented to Congress. This Article will 
not debate the virtues or vices of means-testing as others already have exhaustively tackled this divisive 
and controversial topic. For views opposing means-testing, see Jean Braucher, Increasing Unifarrnity in 
Consumer Ban~ruptcy: Means 'Testing as a Distraction and the National Ban~ptcy Review Commission's 
Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 1 (1998); Gary Klein, Means 'Tested Banl{-
ruptcy: What Would It Mean?, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 711 (1998); Elizabeth Warren, 'The Ban~ptcy 
Crisis, 73 IND. LJ. 1079 (1998). 
5Editorial, Reform C/ioice for Mr. Bush, WASH. PosT, Feb. 19, 2001, at A32 (noting that the challenge 
~is to limit irresponsible abuse of bankruptcy without being too harsh toward those who deserve second 
chances.~). 
6David Frum, Ban~ptcy Reform Is a Moral Issue, WALL. ST.]., Feb. 11, 2000, at A14 rwhat we're 
really arguing about when we argue about bankruptcy law is how far individuals should be expected to go 
on carrying responsibilities that have grown onerous.~). 
7However, virtually all the arguments (and their accompanying rhetoric) heard during recent legisla· 
tive debates over proposed bankruptcy reforms were made and used twenty years ago when Congress 
replaced the Bankruptcy Act with the Bankruptcy Code, and over a decade ago when the Code was 
revised to make it harder for consumers to discharge debts in Chapter 7. Then (as now) commentators 
argued that existing bankruptcy policies encouraged debtors to behave irresponsibly and that bankruptcy 
laws should be amended to encourage debt repayment and discourage discharging debts. See, e.g., Charles 
G. Hallinan, 'The 'Fresh Start' Policy in Consumer Ban~ptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretative 
'Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 51 (1986) (observing that the fresh start policy lacks a ~coherently 
articulated content"); Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Ban1{ruptcy", 21 UCLA L. REv. 
403 (1973) (discussing justifications for debt repayment and arguing that existing bankruptcy theories 
were no longer valid). 
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attitudes toward entitlements in general, and the evolving public view of the 
recipients of public benefits. Part I of this Essay examines the role means-
testing has played in federal public assistance (i.e., welfare) programs. Over 
time, Congress has concluded that means-tested programs are appropriately 
used to force benefit recipients to conform their future social and economic 
behavior to comply with society's view of the model, economically self-suffi-
cient citizen. This Part concludes by suggesting that the public's attitude 
toward the deserving poor changed dramatically once it appeared that (1) the 
recipients of public benefits treated those benefits as entitlements, rather 
than unearned gratuities, (2) the system that provided those benefits en-
couraged the recipients to engage in deviant, socially unacceptable behavior 
and (3) receiving welfare benefits was no longer viewed as a stigmatizing 
event. Notwithstanding sharply conflicting empirical data,8 critics also argue 
that Congress needs to substantially curtail access to the discharge because 
too many people with either present or future financial means are choosing to 
discharge their debts rather than attempt to repay them. 
Part II then examines the historical justifications given for allowing peo-
ple to discharge their debts in bankruptcy. In discussing the purposes of the 
bankruptcy discharge, this Part shows how the traditionally sympathetic 
view of the "'honest debtor" changed once the public became convinced that 
individuals used the bankruptcy system to subsidize their reckless spending 
habits. Moreover, public support for the ability to have a second chance in 
bankruptcy appears to have eroded once the public was lead to believe that 
the bankruptcy system discouraged debtors from repaying debts even though 
they had the means to do so. Finally, public support eroded once the public 
became convinced that filing for bankruptcy, once viewed with shame, no 
longer stigmatizes debtors. 
Part III concludes by suggesting that, while bankruptcy relief should not 
be viewed as an entitlement, it nonetheless should be viewed as a component 
of the federal public assistance system. Restricting bankruptcy relief to those 
who can document a financial need (i.e., means testing) is consistent with the 
types of restrictions Congress historically has imposed on the recipients of 
nonentitlement public assistance benefits. Similarly, using a means test to 
stigmatize debtors and force them to modify their behavior is consistent with 
the role stigma played during welfare reform debates. This Part argues, how-
ever, that a means-tested bankruptcy system must do more than just shame 
debtors or otherwise make it harder for them to discharge debts. To help 
people avoid the need to file for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy system must also 
8U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., Personal Banl{ruptey: Analysis of Four Reports on Chapter 7 Debtors' Ability 
to Pay, REP. No. 99-103 (1999) (noting wide disparity between the results reached in empirical studies). 
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find ways to help debtors both change their overall views toward credit and 
spending and resolve any underlying causes for the economic problems. 
I. THE FEDERAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE SYSTEM 
A. IN GENERAL 
This country historically has been willing to provide public economic as-
sistance to people deemed to be the ""deserving"' poor.9 Indeed, few people 
dispute that the government has a duty to provide minimal economic relief to 
the truly deserving poor. To fulfill this duty, the federal government created 
public financial assistance (i.e., ""welfare") programs. The welfare state gener-
ally consists of programs that provide social insurance benefits (which are 
viewed as entitlements) and programs that provide income-indexed, or 
""means tested" grants of cash or goods.10 
A program is an entitlement program if the enabling statute governing 
the program mandates that the economic assistance be provided to all who 
establish that they have certain predefined attributes.11 Legislative or fund-
ing bodies must then appropriate funds in amounts sufficient to provide bene-
fits for all recipients who possess the statutorily-defined attributes regardless 
of their actual economic need for the benefits. Perhaps the most familiar so-
cial insurance entitlement benefits are (1) those benefits provided to workers 
who pay into the social security system and, at a certain age, exercise their 
right to receive money from the system and (2) the medical benefits provided 
by the Medicare program.12 Based in large part on the enormous public sup-
port for these programs, all attempts to means test social security and Medi-
care benefits have failed.13 
Means-tested public assistance benefits are provided to people whose fi-
nancial resources fall below a specified level. The most prominent means-
9See generally CHRISTOPHER }ENCKS, RETHINKING SoCIAL POLICY: RAcE, PoVERTY, AND THE UN-
DERCLASS 78 (1992), where the author discusses legislators' willingness to generously support the ~deserv­
ing poor~ (children, the elderly and disabled) but not the undeserving poor (single mothers and ~marginally 
employable men whose unemployment benefits had run out~); Lawrence Bobo & Ryan A Smith, Anti· 
poverty Policy, Affirmative Action, and Racial Attitudes, in CoNFRONTING PovERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS 
FOR CHANGE 365, 372 (Sheldon H. Danziger et. aL eds., 1994) (noting public's support for government 
assistance to the poor, but insistence ~that the role be limited and not replace an individual's obligation to 
pursue self-reliance~). . 
10 A third type of assistance,~ socialized~ enterprises, consists of industries the government has national· 
ized to make a product universally available to alL A classic example is public education. 
11See DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE's OwN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE STATE 17 
(1998). 
12See A HAEWORTH ROBERTSON, SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT EVERY TAXPAYER SHOULD KNow 22 
(1992) (discussing components of social security program). 
13See Peter J Ferrara, A Bad Deal Could Get Worse, PLAIN DEALER, May 11, 1999, at llB \Means 
testing Social Security and Medicare also begins the process of turning them into welfare programs. The 
more these programs are means tested, the less the public will support them.~). 
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tested benefits are those provided by Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami-
lies (which replaced the program formerly known as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children), food stamps, supplemental security iricome, subsidized 
public housing, and Medicaid.14 Eligibility for benefits is based on economic 
need and is not linked to the recipient's prior economic behavior. Benefits 
provided typically are lower in amount than those provided through social 
insurance programs and the benefits vary widely from state to state.15 Be-
cause recipients have not earned or otherwise paid for public assistance bene-
fits, benefit recipients are sometimes viewed as unworthy dependents and the 
benefits they receive often are characterized as unearned gratuitous benefits. 
This is in sharp contrast to the public's characterization of the benefits pro-
vided by social insurance or other entitlement programs.16 
The public's view toward programs that provide income-indexed aid to 
poor families has evolved over time. The next section discusses the public's 
increasing dissatisfaction with the lifestyle choices it perceived were being 
made by never-married welfare beneficiaries and the public's insistence that 
federal public assistance programs stress the importance of work and reintro-
duce stigma to the public assistance system. Finally, this section shows how 
the philosophy of the federal public assistance system is now a reciprocal one 
that insists that, in exchange for accepting economic benefits, recipients of 
means-tested public assistance accept certain lifestyle burdens. 
B. AID TO NEEDY FAMILIES 
1. Overview 
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was 
enacted as a part of the Social Security Act of 1935.17 The program was 
aimed at providing means-tested cash aid to help increase the income of poor 
widows with young children.18 Contemporary mores held that the proper 
role of women was to marry, produce children, then remain in the home to 
14See Matthew Diller, Entitlement Exclusion: 'The Role of Disability in the Soda! Welfare System, 44 
UCLA L. REv. 361, 367 (1996); Kelley, supra note 11, at 26. 
15See Janice Peterson, "Ending Welfare As We Know It": 'The Symbolic Importance of Welfare Policy in 
America, 31 J. EcoN. IssuES, 425, 429 (1997). 
16See Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over Again and the Undermin-
ing of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HAsTINGS WoMEN's L.j. 213, 214 (1996). 
17STAFF OF H.R. CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 102o GoNG., 2o SESs~ OvERVIEW oF ENTITLE-
MENT PROGRAMS: 1992 GREENBOOK 603 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Greenbook]. 
18See Jill Duerr Berrick, From Mother"s Duty to Personal Responsibility: 'The Evolution of AFDC. 7 
HAsTINGS WoMEN's LJ. 257,261 (1996); Gary Burtless, Public Spending on the Poor: Historical 'Trends 
and Economic Limits, in CoNFRONTING PovERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 51, 55 (Sheldon H. 
Danziger et al. eds., 1994). The program provided cash payments for needy children deprived of parental 
support or care because a parent was either absent from the home continuously, incapacitated, deceased, or 
unemployed, and for other family members in the household of such needy child. See 1992 GREENBOOK, 
supra note 17, at 603. Eligibility for AFDC ended on a child's eighteenth birthday, or at the state's 
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rear these children. Given this, widowed mothers were viewed as victims 
who deserved financial assistance because they became impoverished through 
no fault of their own.19 At that time, no one seriously suggested that welfare 
laws be used to encourage widowed mothers to leave the home and seek paid 
work in the labor market. In other words, policymakers did not insist that 
welfare beneficiaries accept the burden of marketplace work in exchange for 
accepting the economic benefits the welfare system provided. 
Though policymakers viewed widowed mothers20 sympathetically, the 
benefits awarded by the program initially were not regarded as entitle-
ments.21 AFDC ultimately was viewed as an entitlement program that pro-
vided benefits for all recipients who applied and established their eligibility 
through a means test.ZZ Once it became an entitlement program, AFDC ben-
efits were backed by a Congressional commitment to provide unlimited, 
open-ended funding, and required the states to match federal dollars with 
state dollars.23 
The AFDC program received public attention (and ultimately public de-
rision) when the AFDC caseload swelled in the 1960s and the characteristics 
of both welfare and nonwelfare mothers changed. Specifically, the program 
became increasingly controversial as more nonwhite, nonwidowed women 
became welfare recipients.24 Moreover, as women of all socioeconomic clas-
option, on the child's nineteenth birthday, if the child was a full-time student and likely to complete the 
educational program before reaching age 19. See id. 
19See SARA. LEVITAN, ET AL., WORKING BUT PooR AMERICA's CONTRADICTION 116 (1993). 
200riginally available only to single parent families, the AFDC program eventually was revised to 
extend benefits to needy two-parent families. See Rebecca M. Blank, 'The Employment Strategy: Public 
Policies to Increase Wor~ and Earnings, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 168, 
179 (Sheldon H. Danziger et al. eds., 1994). Despite this expansion, policymakers still viewed benefits 
provided by the program as temporary relief for two-parent families who faced a period of economic crisis 
caused by unexpected unemployment. See SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTTSCHALK, AMERICA UNE· 
QUAL 16 (1995) (~Poverty was seen as primarily an effect of unemployment: if the unemployed could get 
jobs in the expanding postwar economy, they would not be poor.~). 
21See Berrick, supra note 18, at 261. Originally, policymakers viewed AFDC payments as gratuities 
that should be dispensed in accordance with the administrative whim of the government. See William H. 
Simon, 'The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1985). 
22See Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under N.ew Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a 
Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 115, 116 (1998). 
23See Mary R. Mannix et al., Implementation of the 'Temporary Assistance for N.eedy Families Bloc~ 
Grant: An Overview, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE Rev. 868, 870 (1997). AFDC gave the states discretion to 
define the type of recipients who should be treated as ~needy,~ set their own benefit levels, establish 
(within federal limitations) income and resource limits, and administer or supervise the administration of 
the program. See 1992 GREENBOOK, supra note 17, at 603. The states were required, however, to apply 
their standards of need uniformly to all families in similar circumstances. See id. 
24Between 1940 and the mid-1990s, the percentage of white, widowed AFDC residents dropped from 
approximately eighty-five percent to less than forty percent. Moreover, by the mid-1990s, half of the 
AFDC recipients were mothers who had never been married whereas less than two percent of the recipi-
ents were widows. Dan Bloom, AFTER AFDC WELFARE-TO-WORK CHOICES AND CHALLENGES FOR 
STATES 7 (1997), available at <www.mdrc.aa.psiweb.com/Reports/AfterAFDC/After%20AFDC.htm> 
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ses entered the labor market, many openly questioned why the government 
should maintain an entitlement program that paid able-bodied women to re-
main home and rear their children rather than earn wages in the labor market 
to support those children.25 As a result, the government no longer actively 
discouraged states from requiring mothers to perform work in return for re-
ceiving AFDC benefits, even though this meant that the benefit recipient's 
sole job would no longer be bearing then rearing children.26 In other words, 
starting in the late 1960s governmental policy shifted away from viewing the 
welfare system as one that provided no-strings attached entitlements toward 
a system that tied the "'benefit" of public assistance to the "'burden" of work. 
2. Replacing Entitlement Policies with Wor~ Policies 
While widowed mothers originally were not expected to work in the 
labor market, a growing concern over never-married mothers' work histories 
(or lack thereof) and their perceived attitudes toward work lead Congress to 
enact work fare programs. To encourage welfare recipients to work, Con-
gress initiated the Work Incentive Program (WIN) in 1968, which initially 
stressed institutional training to improve recipients' occupational skills and to 
provide job placement assistance for job-ready recipients.27 The underlying 
philosophy behind these programs was that AFDC benefits recipients should 
ultimately become economically self-sufficient by taking advantage of availa-
ble work, education and training opportunities provided. 
When it appeared that some AFDC recipients received benefits for ex-
tended periods of time and seemed unwilling to become economically self-
sufficient, Congress passed the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988, which 
replaced WIN and other work programs with a mandatory new work-wel-
fare program called Job Opportunities and Basic Skills GOBS).28 JOBS placed 
(last visited June 1, 2001); see also Berrick, supra note 18, at 262-64 (stating that the percentage of widows 
receiving AFDC declined from 7% in 1961 to 1.6% in 1991, the percentage of divorced, never married 
mothers rose from 37% in 1950 to 88% in 1990, and the percentage of Caucasian women receiving AFDC 
declined from over 80% in 1939 to 40% in 1990). 
25See Blank, supra note 20, at 184; LEVITAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 116·17; see generally JENCKS, 
supra note 9, at 226-32 (noting that both liheral and conservative legislators agreed that single mothers 
should he encouraged (if not forced) to work outside the home because the majority of married mothers 
had wage-paying jobs). 
26See LEVITAN ET AL~ supra note 19, at 117. 
27See Mark Greenberg, Federal Welfare Reform in Light of the California Experience: Early Lessons for 
State Implementation of the JOBS Program, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 419, 426 (1989·1990); 
Blank, supra note 20, at 181. In 1971, the Talmadge Amendments redirected WIN's focus to the immedi· 
ate employment of AFDC recipients whenever possible. See Greenberg, id at 426·27. By the 1980s 
federal funding of social welfare programs vastly decreased and WIN was reformed to give states greater 
flexibility to design work programs. See id at 427-28; see also DANZIGER & GoTTSCHALK, supra note 20, 
at 25·28 (chronicling retrenchment during the Reagan era). 
28See 1992 Greenbook, supra note 17, at 610. See also DANZIGER & GOTTSCHALK, supra note 20, at 
32 (discussing bipartisan efforts to create JOBS program). JOBS was designed to ensure that welfare 
mothers obtained education, training, and employment to help them avoid long-term welfare dependence. 
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much more emphasis on. training and education, helped recipients with both 
job placement and ancillary work challenges (like obtaining decent and afford-
able child care), required employers to give JOBS workers certain employee 
benefits, and insisted that employers maintain specified health and safety 
standards.29 Though JOBS somewhat improved welfare recipients' employ-
ment opportunities, it never received the resources necessary to transform 
the welfare system into one that transitioned recipients from stay-at-home 
mothers to mothers who earned wages in the market.30 Moreover, because 
welfare recipients seemed "'content" to receive benefits but do nothing in re-
turn for the benefits, stigma joined the demand for work as a key factor in the 
welfare reform debate. 
3. 'The Role of Stigma 
As mothers who were divorced, separated, or never married increasingly 
became the primary recipients of AFDC benefits, the public's attitude to-
ward the system changed dramatically. Critics argued that the welfare sys-
tem created intergenerational dependency and did not sufficiently focus on 
the values of work, marriage, and parental responsibility.31 Since early 
AFDC recipients were deemed to be deserving because of their status (as 
This program capped federal matching funds for JOBS program costs to give states broader discretion to 
determine the scope and content of their program and services. See generally 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 
17, at 610, 611-15 (outlining the state's role in implementing JOBS). 
29See Blank, supra note 20, at 187; 1992 GREENBOOK, supra note 17, at 615. JOBS also ensured 
certain work standards for welfare recipients in the workplace. See Sharon Dietrich et al., Welfare Re-
fonning the WorkJ>lace: Protecting the Employment Rights of Welfare Redpients, Immigrants, and Displaced 
Workers, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 903, 912 nn.69, 72 & 73 (1997) [hereinafter Protecting Employment 
Rights]. 
30See RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAlS, IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL REsPONSIBILITY 
AcT OF 1996: A FIRST LooK 3 (1999) (noting failure of JOBS to ~transform the operation and adminis-
trative culture of AFDC from a cash assistance program that stressed compliance with complex ... 
eligibility criteria to one that emphas~es reducing dependency and getting people jobs.~). 
31See Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 
345, 351 (1996) rThere also seems to be a growing belief that when people resort to AFDC it is not a 
temporary status, but instead leads to generations of welfare dependency, crime, and low academic 
achievement.~); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 66 (1994) 
(discussing view held by conservatives that the AFDC program ~subsid~e[s) immorality by providing 
benefits to illegitimate children ... treats unmarried parents better than married ones ... [and) creates a 
form of dependency that is ... passed from one generation to another.~); CHARLES NoBLE, WELFARE As 
WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 127 (1997) (observing that 
social conservatives felt that the availability of AFDC encouraged single women to have children and 
caused families to break up); see generally MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: 
FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 110-12 (1994); MELNICK, supra, at 117 (discussing results of experimental 
programs that indicated that income guarantees significantly increased likelihood of marital breakup, espe-
cially among racial minorities). But see Rebecca M. Blank, et. al, A Primer on Welfare Refonn, in LooKING 
BEFORE WE LEAP: SociAL SciENCE AND WELFARE REFORM 27, 30-34 (R. Kent Weaver and William T. 
Dickens eds., 1995) [hereinafter Primer) (citing evidence that refutes the claim that welfare payments 
caused the increase in teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births). 
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widowed mothers), the system initially was not designed to stigmatize them. 
This soon changed. 
To discourage women from applying for AFDC benefits and to preserve 
the purported goals of America's market-based economy, policymakers argued 
that the stigmatization process should deter all but the absolutely desperate 
from applying for benefits.32 Indeed, because AFDC recipients received a 
gratuitous, unearned benefit, the government presumed that it could stigma-
tize benefit recipients by demanding that benefit recipients alter their lifes-
tyles. Stigma was deemed to be necessary to combat the view, which some 
argue developed in the 1960s, that AFDC was a value-free entitlement 
program.33 
Those who administered AFDC benefits helped perpetuate the stigmati-
zation of poor mothers. For example, social workers involved with the wel-
fare system often exhibited a commitment to an "'ideology of condescending 
moralism" that viewed poverty as a symptom of personal failure and assumed 
that the poor (like children and lunatics) were incapable of making rational 
and responsible choices.34 The AFDC program mandated that, as a condition 
of receiving benefits, recipients submit to governmental supervision of their 
housekeeping, child rearing, and sexual practices.35 Thus, in addition to re-
viewing recipients' income to determine whether they satisfied the income-
indexed means tests, the government reviewed how benefit recipients in-
tended to spend their income and, to a limited extent, how they managed 
intimate aspects of their lives including their choices about procreation or 
cohabitation.36 Governmental supervision and oversight of the behavior of 
32See Diller, supra note 14, at 374. 
330f course, stigma is a subjective perception. It is quite possible that the recipients of public assis-
tance never felt ~stigmatizedft even though nonrecipients may have viewed the recipients with disdain. See 
generally Joel F. Handler & Ellen J. Hollingsworth, How Obnoxious Is the "Obnoxious Means 'Test"? 'The 
Views of AFDC Recipients, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 114, 128-30 (1970). 
34See Simon, supra note 21, at 2. 
35See}OEL F. HANDLER, THE PovERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 89·90 (1995) (discussing reforms that 
sought to change social behavior and reformers' beliefs that poverty is primarily behavioral, not economic 
or environmental). 
36See Simon, supra note 21, at 2; see also Lucy A. Williams, 'The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modifi-
cation Welfare Refonn Proposals, 102 YALE L.]. 719, 723 (1992); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, 
and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.]. 1198, 1198 (1983) (discussing the imposition of sexual 
morality and ~man-in-the-houseft rules on AFDC recipients). 
Because the AFDC program ~deemedft income (i.e., attributed the income of a nonrecipient to the 
recipient), even being associated with, or providing economic assistance to, a recipient of public assistance 
gave the government the right to intrude into the lives of nonrecipients who had a relationship with the 
benefit recipient. See Diller, supra note 14, at 375. Under the old AFDC program, the income of steppar-
ents, siblings, and grandparents was deemed to be available for the welfare recipient. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(31), (a)(38), (a)(39) (1994) (repealed 1996). In essence, in return for providing benefits, the gov-
ernment essentially demanded that benefit recipients allow the welfare system to scrutinize their economic 
and noneconomic lifestyle choices. 
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AFDC recipients appeared to be designed to force welfare mothers to act 
like, and ultimately to be transformed into, "'the middle class ideal of a work-
ing class person-industrious, economizing, sexually ascetic, politically com-
placent, and socially unambitious."37 The stigmatization process intensified 
in the 1990s when both conservative and liberal politicians were unable to 
explain the concurrence of poverty and work in a strong U.S. economy. 
4. Ending Welfare "As We Know It" 
Policymakers clamored for an end to the entitlement status of AFDC 
benefits based on their view that calling these benefits entitlements pre-
vented the government from making moral distinctions or judgments about 
benefit recipients' need for public assistance and from attaching burdens to 
the benefit award.38 Because work was plentiful, policymakers concluded 
that AFDC recipients were not economic victims, but were instead individ-
ual failures who were allowed to exhibit dysfunctional behavior and maintain 
deviant lifestyles.39 Moreover, when the numbers of recipients of public as-
sistance swelled, critics began to argue that those programs imposed an undue 
financial burden on taxpayers.4° In addition, critics argued that having a gov-
ernment entitlement system that guaranteed unearned income undermined 
the fundamental principles of a market-based economy.41 Liberals and con-
servatives ultimately agreed that only comprehensive reforms could eradicate 
welfare's entitlement status and give the states authority to exercise maxi-
mum flexibility to design their own welfare programs.42 These efforts re-
37See Simon, supra note 21, at 2. 
38See Gertrude Himmelfarb, Comment, in WoRK AND WELFARE 83 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (sug· 
gesting the recent welfare policy eschewed moral distinctions and judgments and provided welfare as a 
matter of right, with no sanctions and no stigma attached to it). 
39See William P. Quigley, Bac~wards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millennium Resem· 
ble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 101, 105 (1998); see also LEVITAN, 
supra note 19, at 3 (~The concurrence of work and poverty is contrary to the American ethos that a 
willingness to work leads to material advancement, and it negates the prevalent view that the cause of 
poverty among adults capable of work is deviant behavior, particularly a lack of commitment to work.w); 
Aaronson, supra note 16, at 231. 
40See Erik G. Luna, Welfare, Fraud and the Fourth Amendment, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 1235, 1283 (1997) 
(describing public assistance as "massive industryw and ~unmitigated fleecing of taxpayer largessew). 
41See William S. Kern, Current Welfare Reform: A Return to the Prindples of 1834,]. EcoN. IssuES 
427, 428 (1998) (noting that classical economists demonstrated the ~incompatibility of poor laws with the 
self-regulating market order and principles of political economyw); DAVID T. ELLWOOD, PooR SuPPORT: 
PovERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 6 (1988) (noting conflict between public welfare assistance and 
societal values of autonomy, responsibility, and work). Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman, The ]\{ature of 
Dependendes And Welfare "Reform·, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 287, 291(1996) (characteri2;ing the Amer· 
ican society as one that ~mythologizes concepts such as 'self-sufficiency,' 'independence,' and 'autonomy,' 
and vilifies the concrete indications all around us that these ideals are unrealiz;able and unrealisticw). 
42See Mary Jo Bane & Richard Weissbourd, Welfare Reform and Children, 9 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 
131, 131 (1998); BILL CLINTON & AL GoRE, PuTTING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL CHANGE 
AMERICA (1992); We Offer Our People a ]\{ew Choice Based on Old Values, WAsH. PosT, Jul. 17, 1992, at 
A26 (reprint of Bill Clinton's Democratic nomination acceptance speech); David Whitman, War on Wei· 
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suited in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (the "Act"').43 
While the Act recognized the need to provide financial assistance to 
needy families, its stated purpose was to enforce traditional majoritarian 
norms such as the Protestant work ethic, heterosexual marriage and a "'tradi-
tional" family structure.44 The Act proceeded from the view that persistent 
unabated poverty results from a person's personal and moral shortcomings, 
that welfare had become a way of life for some recipients, and that welfare 
laws should be used to modify the behavior of both welfare recipients and the 
agencies that administered the benefits.45 Moreover, the Act conclusively 
establishes Congressional authority to use public assistance programs to en-
force social expectations.46 
fare Dependency, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Apr. 20, 1992, at 34; GOP Contract with America, 52 
CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3216,3217 (1994); Barbara Vobejda, GOP Welfare Plan Would Shrin~ the System, 
WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 1994, at A23 (discussing GOP goal of ending welfare as an entitlement system). 
43Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 
Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21 and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1996)). 
44See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (Supp. II 1996). Congress included the following findings in the Act: mar-
riage is the foundation of a successful society; marriage is an essential institution of a successful society 
which promotes the interests of children; and, promoting responsible fatherhood and motherhood is inte-
gral to successful child rearing and the well-being of children. See id. § 601 Explanatory notes (1)-(3). The 
Act specifically seeks to advance certain ~family values.~ See 42 U.S.C. § 607(h) (Supp. II 1996) (imposing 
additional requirements on noncustodial, nonsupporting minor parents). Likewise, it allows states to re-
duce or eliminate assistance for noncooperation in establishing paternity or obtaining child-support. See id. 
§ 608(a)(2). 
See generally HEALTH, EDuc. & HuM. SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. No. 98-109, 
States are Restructuring Programs to Reduce Welfare Dependence, 14 (1998) [hereinafter GAO Report] 
(discussing objectives of TANF). Cf. Welfare Reform Proposals, Including HR 4605, 'The Wor~ and 
Responsibility Act of 1994: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1156-57 (1994) (statement of Deborah Lewis, Legislative Coun-
sel, American Civil Liberties Union) (criticizing proposed paternity establishment requirement). 
45See GAO Report, supra note 44, at 17. See also joEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, WE 
THE PooR PEOPLE: WoRK, PovERTY, AND WELFARE 7 (1997) (stating that one of ~family values~ 
themes of 1996 welfare reforms was to require states to terminate welfare benefits if mother refuses to 
cooperate in establishing paternity and obtaining child support). Cf. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND 
ENTITLEMENT: THE SoCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 47 (1986) (arguing that prior welfare reforms 
were doomed to fail because recipients were never told what was expected of them in terms of their 
personal conduct). 
46See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 45, at 6-7 (discussing the four major themes of the new legisla-
tion, including the provisions dealing with family values, work ethic, etc.); see also GwENDOLYN MINK, 
WELFARE's END 69·77 (1998) (characterizing 1996 welfare reform as an attempt to force men to act like 
responsible providers for the families). Few disputed that there was a close correlation between the 
increase in births to unmarried women and the increase in the number of children receiving public assis-
tance. As these unmarried women were younger and more likely to be long-term welfare recipients, 
Congress sought to halt those increases by encouraging states to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-
of-wedlock pregnancies by getting ~tough~ with unwed teenage mothers. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3) (Supp. 
II 1996). 
Congress justified its goal of promoting marriage and two-parent families by relying on data that imply 
that poor single parents are bad parents. See 42 U.S.C. 601(a)(4) (Supp. II 1996). Congressional findings 
254 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 75 
The congressional findings in the Act revealed a national "crisis" which 
was addressed in the welfare program that repealed AFDC, Temporary Aid 
to Needy Families (T ANF).47 T ANF consolidates federal funding for prior 
welfare programs and administers these funds as a block grant to each state.48 
T ANF gives each state broad discretion in constructing its own assistance 
program and eliminates the AFDC guarantee of aid to eligible individuals.49 
Because T ANF is not an entitlement program, states can now decide which 
categories of needy families to assist, how to assist them, and how best to 
treat a potential recipient's current assets or income.50 To modify the bu-
reaucratic behavior of states when they administer the grants, however, Con-
gress retained the requirement that benefits be means-tested but also 
attached additional conditions to the T ANF grants. 5 1 
T ANF imposes one important restriction on the states' ability to assist 
needy families: mandatory work requirements. 52 Recipients, even those with 
small children, generally are expected to work in the labor market while they 
in the Act state that almost fifty percent of single mothers receive public assistance compared to only 
twenty percent of divorced mothers; the children of unmarried mothers are four times more likely to be 
expelled or suspended from school than the children of married mothers; and, areas with larger percentages 
of teenage youth and single-parent households have higher rates of violent crime. See id. § 60I(b) Explana-
tory notes (9). 
47See id. § 60I(b) Explanatory notes (10). TANF also replaced Emergency Assistance for Needy 
Families and JOBS. See Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103(a)(l), 
110 Stat. at 2112. 
48See Joel F. Handler, Welfare to Wor~: Reform or Rhetoric?, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 635, 638 (1998). 
TANF froze federal funding to the states through fiscal year 2002. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(I)(A) (Supp. II 
1996). 
49See 42 U.S.C. § 60I(a) and § 60I(b) (Supp. V 1999). See also Himmelfarb, supra note 38, at 83, 
where the author observes that 
In devolving welfare to the states, the national government, while continuing to 
fund welfare, no longer does so as a legal entitlement. And the states, by attaching 
conditions to welfare - work provisions or time limits, or denial of allowances for 
additional children born out of wedlock, or the requirement that teenage single 
mothers live with their parents - are sending important moral messages to the poor 
and to society at large. 
50With limited exceptions, each state is free to allocate its block grant in any manner reasonably 
calculated to achieve the goals ofT ANF (i.e., assist needy families) promote job preparation, work, and 
marriage, prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and encourage the formation and maintenance of 
two-parent families. See 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(I) (Supp. II 1996). T ANF thus gives the state the option of 
moving away from cash benefits towards other forms of support. See Mannix et al., supra note 23, at 874. 
51 For example, Congress conditioned federal funding on the state's submission of a plan that outlines 
its family assistance program. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. II 1996). In addition, to receive a full grant, 
each state must also maintain at least seventy-five percent of its historic level of state welfare expenditure 
and generally must continue to spend state funds equal to at least eighty percent of its AFDC-related 
spending. See id. § 609(a)(7); see also NATHAN & GAlS, supra note 30, at I (observing that welfare reform 
sought to modify the behavior of both recipients and bureaucrats). 
52 See id. at 23. States are required to move an increasing percentage of welfare recipients into the 
workforce, starting with twenty-five percent of the adults in single parent families in 1997 and increasing 
to fifty percent by 2002. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(a). 
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are receiving T ANF.53 Politicians demanded that benefit recipients work to 
combat the prevailing view that the AFDC program denigrated the impor-
tance of work in the labor market. 54 States also must require a recipient to 
work within twenty-four months of receiving aid.55 In fact, in many states 
welfare offices effectively function as job placement centers since many enroll 
mothers in welfare-to-work programs when the mothers apply for welfare 
benefitss6 and all require potential benefit recipients to sign "'Personal Re-
sponsibility Agreements" that detail the level of their participation in job-
search and related work activities.57 
T ANF assumes that tough work requirements will reduce welfare costs, 
replace the entitlement status and permissiveness of the AFDC era, and pro-
mote the values of responsibility and self-sufficiency.58 To emphasi4e that 
T ANF benefits are not guaranteed welfare entitlements, T ANF provides 
that any recipient who refuses to comply with its requirements (including 
engaging in work) faces a termination or reduction of benefits even if the 
53TANF restricts the ability of the states to exempt single parents with infants or toddlers from 
working in the labor market. While the JOBS program permitted states to exempt single parents of 
children under the age of three from work-participation, see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C)(iii) (repealed 
1996), TANF allows them to exempt single parents of children under the age of one and for no longer 
than twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(5) (Supp. II 1996). 
54For example, data indicated that some welfare users chose to be long-term system users because the 
system had weak incentives for them to work. See CoMM. ON THE BUDGET, WELFARE AND MEDICAID 
REFORM ACT OF 1996: A HELPING HAND, NOT A HANDOUT, H.R. Rep. No. 104-651, at 4 (1996) (citing 
a Cato Institute Study which found that welfare benefits were more generous than work and thereby 
encouraged long term dependency); see also Robert A. Solomon, Ending Welfare Mythology As We Know 
It, 15 YALE}. ON REG. 177, 189-90 (1998) (book review) (citing findings which support the notion that 
some mothers choose welfare over work rationally.); JENcKs, supra note 9, at 223-25 (positing that welfare 
mothers refuse to work in low-wage jobs if they are left as poor as if they remained in the home); MEAD, 
supra note 45, at 109-11 (suggesting that poor should be forced to take any available job, even menial 
ones). 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1996). Unless it opts out, a state must also require recipi-
ents to undertake community service within two months of receiving assistance. Id. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iv). 
56See GAO Report, supra note 44, at 26. 
51 See NATHAN & GAlS, supra note 30, at 4, 12. TANF prohibits states from treating education and 
training as work, and limits the weeks of job search and vocational education that count as work-participa-
tion. See id. § 607(c)(2). The Act supporters viewed education and training simply as a means of shirking 
work. According to Senator Gramm: ~work does not mean sitting in a classroom. Work means work.~ 
See Matthew Diller, Worl{ing Without a job: 'The Social Messages of the N.ew Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & 
PoL'Y REv. 19,25 (1998). TANF also precludes secondary, post-secondary, and other educational place-
ments of adults from work activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1996). The Act also mandates 
the minimum number of hours that a recipient must work and requires states to ensure that steadily 
increasing percentages of welfare families are participating in work activities. States risk fiscal penalties if 
they fail to meet their work-participation rates. See id. §§ 607(s)(1)(A) and 609(a)(3}. 
58See Handler, supra note 48, at 642; see, e.g., MEAD, supra note 45, at 67 ("The moral lessons most 
people learn, that they must work and take care of their families if they are to prosper, were blocked for 
much of the underclass by federal policy. Society normally exacts work or other contributions from its 
members in return for support.~). 
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recipient otherwise satisfies the means testing requirement.59 In short, the 
principle of reciprocity-i.e., recipients must provide useful services in ex-
change for benefits-became the philosophical underpinning for the new 
workfare (i.e., old welfare) program.60 Moreover, as the next section suggests, 
this principle is now changing the way all public assistance programs are 
viewed. 
C. RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENT PoLITICS 
The recent assault on entitlement programs indicates that policymakers 
will no longer allow any federal assistance program to be viewed as one that 
provides an entitlement unless the benefit recipient has earned the right to 
demand the benefit payments. Indeed, a marked discontent with ""rights" and 
""entitlements" has permeated the political discourse for the last decade and 
politicians of both parties have called for a return to personal responsibility.61 
Critics suggest that entitlement programs transform private, unregulated re-
quests for funds into a guaranteed property interest and gives benefit recipi-
ents the legal right to demand that society protect that property right against 
any challenges to, or interference with, their right to the property.62 
Critics contend that modern welfare rights have been construed to be 
entitlements to certain goods or services, not merely the right to obtain those 
services using ones' labor in the market.63 This view of a ""right" makes an 
entitlement different from the classical conception of rights, which conceived 
of rights as the rules that govern the process of producing goods and services 
that people desire.64 Thus, rather than giving nonworking recipients of enti-
tlements the right to work to earn goods or services, critics suggest that 
welfare rights require that the product or outcome of the efforts of working, 
productive members of society be redistributed to ensure that everyone 
(workers and nonworkers) enjoys certain goods.65 Some criticiz;e this view of 
the entitlement system because it gives benefit recipients the right to demand 
that others provide goods or services to them simply because they cannot (or 
will not) work to earn the goods or services themselves.66 
59See 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (Supp. II 1996). 
60See Diller, supra note 57, at 27. 
61See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility. 43 DuKE L.J. 989, 999 (1994). 
62See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem of Integrat-
ing Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LoY. LA. L. REV. 1063, 1076 (1997). See also McClain, supra 
note 61, at 1039 (characterizing new communitarians' view that legal rights ~provide protection against 
legal coercion, preserving a zone of noninterference or immunity~). For an in-depth discussion of the 
structure and substance of legal entitlements, see Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 
CoRNELL L. REv. 822 (1993). 
63KELLEY, supra note 11, at 16. 
64Id. at 22. 
65See id. 
66See id. 
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In recent years, politicians and the public alike have harshly judged able-
bodied people who depend on others for economic support, yet seem to feel 
no loss of esteem or remorse (i.e., stigma) for being economically dependent. 
Not surprisingly, there is even a stigma attached to the term entitlement. 
The term is now used pejoratively to reflect the public's disdain with the 
concept of claiming a right to an unearned gratuitous payment. Policymakers 
now reject the notion of calling an unearned benefit an entitlement because 
doing so suggests that the government does not have the right to place re-
strictions on those benefits and cannot use the system to control the recipi-
ents' social behavior.67 
Policymakers now advocate social welfare policies that combine compas-
sion and a sense of obligation to those in need with an insistence that the 
individual (and the individual's family or community) rather than the govern-
ment assume the initial responsibility of providing for the individual's eco-
nomic needs.6s Indeed, a philosophical perspective (commonly referred to as 
the ''Third Way"') has been advanced by politically moderate members of 
both political parties during the last few years. The Third Way generally 
advocates a partnership of the government and the corporate sector with 
""civil society."'69 Advocates of this principle believe that the dynamism of the 
free market should be combined with a commitment to social justice.7° The 
hallmark of this combination is an end to entitlement politics, the eradication 
of the notion that people can get something for nothing or that. rights can 
exist without corresponding responsibilities, and a renewed emphasis on 
stigma.71 
Critics of entitlement politics attribute the loss of stigma to an excessive 
focus on rights, which takes place to the detriment of emphasizing personal 
accountability. The country's long relationship with entitlement politics has 
purportedly lead to an absence of a sense of personal and social responsibility, 
which critics argue explains a wide range of self-destructive and socially 
costly behaviors.72 This explosion of rights is alleged to be accompanied by a 
corresponding plunge in personal responsibility, which is then manifest in the 
67See Diller, supra note 14, at 458. 
68See McClain, supra 61, at 1023-24 eit is likely that behind the charges of the rights explosion and 
flight from responsibility lie philosophical and political divisions over the appropriate role of government in 
alleviating human suffering and providing security against contingency, as well as disagreements over 
whether such government assumption of responsibility leads to or licenses individual irresponsibility~) 
(footnotes omitted). 
69See Peter Edelman, Welfare and the "'Third Way; DissENT, Winter 1999, at 14. 
70See id. Politicians are in essence espousing the views of~new~ communitarians, who seek to rebuild 
the country's moral foundations and increase our sense of personal and collective responsibility. See Mc-
Clain, supra note 61, at 999. 
71See Edelman, supra note 69, at 14. 
72See McClain, supra note 61 at 1001-18. 
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tendency to shift blame away from one's personal faults, to look for external 
causes to blame, to hide these personal failures from neighbors and peers by 
masking them by rights talk, and generally to assume the "'mantle of the vic-
tim."73 Modern critics of entitlement politics further claim that "'liberal 
rights talk" vitiates basic values like personal responsibility, family cohesion, 
and the work ethic, and thus licenses irresponsibility_74 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
Given the unsavory, negative connotations surrounding the term entitle-
ment and the notion that the term entitlement now means getting something 
for nothing (or receiving a gratuity but claiming it as a right), it is not surpris-
ing that critics argue that we must end bankruptcy "'as we know it." Before 
discussing the proposals to modify existing laws, I first briefly discuss the 
evolution of bankruptcy relief from a purely punitive creditor-driven system 
to a somewhat more humane one that balances the needs of debtors and 
creditors. 
A. HISTORY OF THE DISCHARGE 
The bankruptcy system serves two primary (but contradictory) func-
tions: to collect debts75 and to forgive debts.76 The debt collection function, 
unlike the debt forgiveness function, is relatively noncontroversial. Embed-
ded in the American culture is the view that people should pay their bills and 
that they have a moral duty to make good on their promise to pay-even if 
bankruptcy laws give them a legal right not to pay.77 To encourage people to 
repay their debts, early bankruptcy laws functioned as quasi-criminal statutes 
designed to deter financial irresponsibility.78 Moreover, early bankruptcy 
laws were designed to stigmatize and punish people who failed to pay their 
73See id. at 1021, 1060. 
74See id. at 1023. 
75H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6321-24 (discussing 
debt repayment goal). 
76The fresh start policy gives ~the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the 
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future 
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.~ Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
u.s. 234, 244 (1934). 
77See Hallinan, supra note 7, at 140 (~[T]he moral obligation to keep one's promises is a virtually 
universal ethical precept.~); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. 
REv. 177, 215 ("Promise-keeping and an instinct for fairness and reciprocity are deeply embedded in our 
natures and underlie our social structure.~); Shuchman, supra note 7, at 452-53 (characterizing the "obliga-
tion of debt as a social phenomenon, the common assumption being that in this society debtors should pay 
their debts to creditors. It is considered by many to be a part of our whole social fabric~). But cf. 
Shuchman, supra note 7, at 434 ("The legal rule of promising that will create an enforceable obligation 
does not by itself give right to a moral obligation.~). 
78See CHARLEs JoRDAN TABB, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY 30-36 (1997); G. Stanley Joslin, The Phi-
losophy ofBanl{ruptcy- A Re-Examination, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 189, 192 (1964); Charles Jordan Tabb, The 
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bills.79 Creditors could have debtors adjudged "'offenders"' under these early 
laws and, until the mid-nineteenth century, could have debtors imprisoned.80 
Thus, bankruptcy initially functioned solely as a creditor-focused process de-
signed to stigmatize debtors by stressing that their inability (or unwilling-
ness) to pay their debts indicated that they had committed a moral 
indiscretion. 81 
The bankruptcy system developed a less creditor-focused approach in the 
mid-nineteenth century.82 The rise and importance of the merchant class, 
combined with the corresponding increase in business failures caused by this 
new economic class, fundamentally changed public attitudes toward buying 
on credit and toward the defaults that necessarily follow an increase in credi-
tors.s3 Though the stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy appeared to 
exist until the middle of the twentieth century,84 policymakers eventually 
abandoned the view that economic failure equated with dishonesty and 
irresponsibility. ss 
By the late nineteenth century, bankruptcy laws began to consider the 
History of the Banl{ruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 5, 7·8 (1995) [hereinaf· 
ter Tabb, History]. 
79Jd. 
80See Tabb, History, supra note 78, at 7·8. See also Michael Higgins, Putting Bac~ the Bite, 84 A.BA. 
]., June 1998, at 74, 74 (commenting on ~the days of ancient Rome, when debtors could be sold into 
slavery upon default, and the days of the colonial debtor prisons~). For a discussion of the general change 
in approach to a debtor's right to discharge legal obligations in bankruptcy, see Charles Jordan Tabb, 'The 
Historical Evolution of the Banl{ruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.]. 325 (1991). 
81See Shuchman, supra note 7, at 455·56 ("[M]any, probably most, persons in our society view debt 
payment as a matter of duty. They repay their debts (and judge others accordingly) not so much because 
they think that it is just to do so or because it will bring about the most good for themselves or for all, but 
because it is proper and right to pay one's debts.~) (footnote omitted). 
82The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was the first American law that abandoned the idea that bankruptcy 
laws existed for the benefit of the creditors alone and allowed debtors to voluntarily bring their estates 
into the bankruptcy courts for equitable distribution. The law recogn~ed the justice of granting a dis· 
charge to the honest, financially troubled debtor, but only if he had surrendered all his assets and aided his 
creditors in real~ing as much as possible from the estate. See 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON 
THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 8, at 17 (5th ed. 1950). 
83See Hallinan, supra note 7, at 56, where the author discusses the developing perception at the time 
that there was a ~significant possibility that economic failures were produced by economic forces no more 
controllable or predictable than visitation by a tornado or the bite of a wild dog.~ 
840ne wonders when this alleged bankruptcy stigma last existed, as an academic commentator ob· 
served over thirty years ago that ~while one may become somewhat stigmat~ed as a result of bearing the 
label of a bankrupt, this stigma is becoming of diminishing social importance.~ Joslin, supra note 78, at 192. 
See also Shuchman, supra note 7, at 413 (noting that bankruptcy is character~ed as ~a labeling process 
[that] inflict[s] a stigma upon the bankrupt~ and cautions that ~the anticipated or actual impact of bank· 
ruptcy may vary greatly by type of person or group~). But see Lisa J. Mcintyre, A Sociological Perspective 
on Banl{ruptcy, 65 IND. LJ. 123, 129·130 (1989) (questioning the continued importance of the conse· 
quences of social stigma, or a ~stain on one's reputation and one's 'good name,~ but suggesting that law· 
suits alleging libel indicate that at least some people remained concerned about social stigma). 
85See Margaret Howard, A 'Theory of Discharge in Consumer Banl{ruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 1047, 1052 
(1987) (noting that ~[t]he policy of rewarding the honest debtor with discharge represents a major depar· 
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needs and interests of both creditors and debtors by recognizing the impor-
tance of rehabilitating entrepreneurial merchants and traders (the only indi-
viduals initially eligible to be bankrupts).86 Indebtedness, once regarded 
solely as a sign of extravagance and poor financial management, came to be 
seen as an appropriate (indeed essential) part of the development of America's 
commercial activities.87 Faced with the practical reality that keeping entre-
preneurs hopelessly insolvent ultimately harmed society and created expen-
sive social costs, policymakers responded by making bankruptcy laws less 
punitive.88 
Though nineteenth century laws were somewhat more humane, the focus 
remained on assisting creditors and protecting society until Congress passed 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.89 The Act, which allowed both entrepreneurs 
and wage earners to discharge their debts, was designed to encourage wage 
earners to restructure their debts, then pay them in full to avoid the stigma of 
being labeled "financially irresponsible."90 During most of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, bankruptcy filings by individuals were still rare, presumably 
because Americans continued to believe that they had a moral duty to pay 
their bills.91 Indeed, it appears that the continued bankruptcy stigma caused 
some Americans to file for bankruptcy only if they were in dire financial need 
ture from the view that defaulters are, simply because of default, deserving of punishment for their guilt, 
negligence, or indolence~). 
86Before Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a person who filed for bankruptcy was 
referred to as a ~bankrupt,~ a word whose very etymology implies ~disgrace.~ See Israel Treiman, Acts of 
Banl{ruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modem Banl{ruptcy Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 189, n.2 (1938) (noting 
that the word bankruptcy is derived from a medieval custom of ~breaking the bench~ of a debtor who 
absconded with his creditors' property). The current term ~debtor~ does not carry as harsh connotations, 
which had lead some to suggest that this change in nomenclature has, itself, led to an increase in filings. 
See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 77, at 219 {noting that replacing term bankrupt with debtor in the 
Code contributed to the loss of stigma associated with bankruptcy). 
87See Hallinan, supra note 7, at 56. 
88See Joslin, supra note 78, at 191 (noting that the ~concern for the debtor and his rehabilitation~ 
resulted from the ~practical realization that a hopeless, unrelievable financial situation leads to ... suicides, 
and criminality concomitant to financial despair.~). 
89'fhe Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898 {the Nelson Act), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 {repealed 1978). 
90See Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966) (discussing stigma associated with 
liquidating rather than repaying bills). 
91See e.g., Resolved: The Time has Come for Means Testing Consumer Banl{ruptcy- A Debate, 17 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 {1998) (hereinafter ABI DEBATE) {Comment of George Wallace): 
[A] second practical limit upon the use of bankruptcy [has] been a sense of per-
sonal responsibility amongst Americans that they will not use bankruptcy and shed 
their contractual, their moral obligations, to repay people that have loaned them 
money, unless they are in dire need. We call this ~bankruptcy stigma~ sometimes, 
but it is essentially a feeling of personal responsibility that has controlled the abuse 
of bankruptcy. The statute is vulnerable to abuse, but a sense of personal responsi-
bility amongst Americans has controlled its use. 
See also Treiman, supra note 86, at 189 (stating that the ~stigma of bankruptcy~ was as present in 1938 as 
it had been in the seventeenth century). 
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(but they still would sometimes repay debts that had been discharged in 
bankruptcy).92 Just as critics of the AFDC program argued that welfare rolls 
swelled because the welfare system condoned financially and morally irre-
sponsible behavior, critics of the current bankruptcy system argue that con-
sumer bankruptcy filings have increased over the last twenty years because 
the Bankruptcy Code93 (which replaced the Bankruptcy Act) encourages 
debtors to discharge their debts without even attempting to repay some of 
them.94 
B. CURRENT UsE/ ABUSE OF THE DISCHARGE 
People who choose not to repay their current debts from future income 
are eligible to discharge their debts in bankruptcy even though they techni-
cally may not be insolvent.95 People with ""means"' are entitled to bankruptcy 
relief because the Code does not require that debtors prove that their total 
outstanding indebtedness exceeds the value of their assets (i.e., that they are 
unable to pay their debts).96 As the Code does not require debtors to prove 
that they need debt relief due to insolvency, all people (whether members of 
92See F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, 'The Banl{ruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 194 (1998) 
(noting that Sir Walter Scott and Mark Twain worked to repay debts even though they had been legally 
discharged). Professor Howard characteri~es the situation facing the debtor as a ~no·win~ situation 
because: 
[A] debtor unable to satisfy his obligations experiences resulting feelings of shame, 
but the bankruptcy process that is supposedly psychologically liberating is now said 
to be stigmat~ing. Thus, the debtor hopelessly mired in debt faces psychological 
trauma whether he is in bankruptcy or not, and the process is alleged to be simulta· 
neously freeing and stigmat~ing. 
Howard, supra note 85, at 1061 (footnotes omitted). 
9311 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994) [hereinafter ~Code~ or ~Bankruptcy Code~]. 
94See Brenda Anthony, "Substantial Abuse" Under Section 707(B) of the Banl{ruptcy Code: American 
Consumers Learn Declaring Banl{ruptcy May Cease 'To Be A Way Out, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 535, 550 
(1999) (noting creditors' argument that ~the bankruptcy process allows, even encourages consumers to 
discharge debts they could afford to pay but want to escape~); Jones & Zywicki, supra note 77, at 209·15 
(arguing that the increase in bankruptcy filings result from changes in the law which ~increased the net 
economic benefit of filing bankruptcy~}; Hallinan, supra note 7, at 89 (citing sources that attempt to 
explain the ~sudden and undoubtedly large increase in the number of consumer filings almost immediately 
following the Code's effective date~); Frum, supra note 6, at A14 (suggesting that Code's ~leniency~ caused 
the wave of~consumer debt-skipping.~); Robert J. Samuelson, Banl{ruptcy for Profit, WASH. PosT, Aug. 25, 
1999, at A17 (blaming the Code for increased filings). But cf. Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is ]{ot Enough: 
Preserving Consumers· Rights to Banl{ruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455 (1999) (noting that the Code 
consciously intended to promote Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 and arguing against reforms to prevent Chap· 
ter 13 filings). 
95 Although the principle of insolvency was a principal concern of earlier bankruptcy laws, this is no 
longer true. See 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, supra note 82, § 16 at 33. 
96While earlier laws considered the sufficiency of a debtor's assets when an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition was filed, the Code replaces the insolvency requirement with an alternative ground: whether the 
debtor pays her debts when they become due. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1). Indeed, the Code requires proof 
of insolvency only when a municipality files for relief under Chapter 9. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(32), 109(c). 
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the lower, middle, or upper economic classes) are eligible for relief under 
Chapter 7 and can discharge their debts in a Chapter 7 liquidation case 
though they theoretically may have the means to pay at least some of their 
debts over time through a Chapter 13 wage earner's plan.97 
In recent years, people of all socioeconomic classes have filed for bank-
ruptcy in record numbers.98 Indeed, the popular media has widely dissemi-
nated the credit lobby's message that allowing people with disposable 
current, or anticipated future, income to discharge their debts encourages 
them to live beyond their economic means.99 Despite intense criticisms of the 
current use and abuse of the discharge, and the fact that it embraces the 
"morally counterintuitive" concept of excusing people from repaying bills 
rightfully or legally owed, 100 bankruptcy commentators and critics do not 
suggest that Congress completely abolish the bankruptcy discharge. Critics 
of current bankruptcy laws argue instead that reforms are needed to combat 
the two main causes for the recent increase in consumer bankruptcy filings. 
First, critics argue that current bankruptcy laws encourage people to run 
up debts a reasonable economic actor would never have incurred, then dis-
charge them even though they have the present means or the future capacity 
to repay those debts.101 To prevent this, critics argue that the Code must be 
revised to discourage this opportunistic behavior.102 Second, critics suggest 
97In general, as long as a debtor has not engaged in certain acts of misconduct and has not dismissed 
any other case within the past 180 days, she is entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 
727(a). If the court finds that allowing the case to proceed would be a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy 
laws, however, it may dismiss the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). For an exhaustive discussion of the 
factors courts should consider when determining what it means to have the ~ability to pay~ debts, see In re 
Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 184·211 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998). 
98There were 287,570 nonbusiness filings in 1980, 718,107 in 1990, and 1,398,182 in 1998. See An· 
mud Total Banl{rttptcy Filings for 1990·1998 (last visited May 29, 2001) <http://www.abiworld.org/ 
stats/newstatsfront.html>. Although the number of filings decreased in 1999 (1,281,581) and in 2000 
(1,217,972), see id, the numbers most likely will increase for the next few years if the economy slows, as is 
anticipated. See also NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW CoMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 20 YEARS (1997), 
82 [hereinafter REPORT] (noting bankruptcy filings are three times what they were in 1980}. Peter Pae & 
Stephanie Stoughton, Personal Banl{rttptcy Filings Hit Record, Easy Credit Blamed, Congress May Act, 
WAsH. PosT, June 7, 1998, at A1 (reporting that filings increased twenty percent from 1996 to 1997 and 
that one in every seventy households filed for bankruptcy during that period). 
99See Samuelson, supra note 94 at A17 (arguing that laws are lax and encourage overborrowing}; 
From, supra note 6, at A14 (blaming bankruptcy laws for filing increase); Dawn Kopecki, American Debt· 
ors Turn to Chapters 7, 13 Banl{rttptcy Process Becomes Easier; Stigma of Insolvency Goes Belly Up, WASH. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al. 
")()Steve France, Sha~espeare in Debt, WAsH. PosT, May 18, 1999, at A23 (conceding that bank· 
ruptcy relief is ~morally counterintuitive,~ but characterizing it as ~right in tune with the primal American 
philosophy of second chances and fresh starts~). 
101Editorial, Going for Bro~e, THE BosTON GLOBE, March 10, 1998, at A10 (stating that the present 
abuse of the system ~requires tightening the mechanism for awarding bankruptcy protection~); John C. 
Weistart, The Costs of Banl{rttptcy, 41.4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (1977) (noting there are 
certain limited circumstances where ~we must recognize that some debts are simply uncollectible~). 
102Helen Dewar & Kathleen Day, Senate Approves Banl{rttptcy Bill: Industry-Sought Overhaul Passes 
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that filings have increased because there no longer is a stigma attached to 
being a debtor. They cite recent filings by celebrities to support their con-
tention that Americans no longer believe that they have a duty to try to 
repay their debts.103 To prevent this, they argue that the process to dis-
charge debts must be made more onerous and that doing so will reintroduce 
stigma in the bankruptcy system. 
1. Banl{ruptcy Opportunism 
Academic and industry critics maintain that consumer bankruptcy filings 
increased because the system encourages debtors to engage in undesirable 
strategic financial behavior (i.e., it promotes bankruptcy opportunism). Bank-
ruptcy opportunism occurs when a debtor systematically and strategically 
engages in morally or legally unconscionable and irrational economic behavior 
because of her knowledge that the bankruptcy system will subsidize the costs 
of her conduct.104 This bankruptcy safety net, critics suggest, underestimates 
the real costs of the debtor's irresponsible spending by forcing individual 
creditors and society as a whole to subsidize or at least bear a portion of 
those costs.105 Just as welfare reformers argued that the AFDC program 
incentivized behavior that was not consistent with this country's market-
based economy, critics contend that the bankruptcy system incentivizes op-
portunistic behavior that also conflicts with fundamental tenets of our econ-
omy. In short, critics argue that bankruptcy opportunism explains the 
skyrocketing rate of bankruptcy filings in the last decade notwithstanding a 
strong U.S. economy and virtually full employment.106 
83·14, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al (noting that credit lobby argued that debtors are ~exploiting 
loopholes~ to escape paying their debts}. 
103See Samuelson, supra note 94, at A17 rRepaying what you borrowed was once an important part 
of the nation's moral code. It is increasingly less so.~}; Mcintyre, supra note 84 at 133-37 (discussing the 
importance of trust in social relationships and social systems). But see Shuchman, supra note 7, at 429·30 
(suggesting the impersonal nature of credit relationships have diminished the ~elements of social and per-
sonal wrong in not paying one's debts~}. 
104See Thomas H. Jackson, 'The Fresh-Start Policy in BanJvuptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1402 
(1985). See also Buckley & Brinig, supra note 92, at 189-91 (noting that 1984 bankruptcy reforms were 
designed to curb debtor opportunism}. 
105See In re Mathenia, 220 B.R. 427, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998} (referring to debtors in the case as 
~the poster children for the standard creditors" argument, to which this court does not subscribe, that 
bankruptcy is too easy, is constantly taken advantage of by unscrupulous debtors, and operates against the 
interest of society in general, not to mention creditors in particular~). Cf. Jackson, supra note 104, at 1422 
n.95 (explaining why allowing a debtor to switch to a lower wage job to avoid repaying a debt creates a 
negative externality because the decision to earn less (but consume more leisure) costs the debtor nothing 
but imposes a social cost on creditors). 
106Until the year 2001, the economy was strong, as evidenced by several years of growth above three 
percent no recession or depression, and low unemployment rates. See S. Report No. 49, 106th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2 (1999);Jonathon Peterson, U.S. Economy Continues its Swift Growth, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 5, 
1999, at Al. See also REPORT, supra note 98, at 84 roespite low unemployment, low inflation, low 
mortgage rates, and a long period of economic expansion, a growing number of American families no longer 
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Just as welfare critics argued that T ANF needed to replace the old wel-
fare system, which encouraged mothers to remain unemployed, bankruptcy 
critics argue that current bankruptcy laws must be revised because those 
laws encourage debtors to incur debt irresponsibility then seek to discharge 
those debts without even attempting to repay them.107 Notwithstanding 
this assertion, neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence suggests that most 
debtors strategically abuse current bankruptcy laws or are high wage-earners 
who intentionally engage in fraud. 108 Virtually no one disputes that at least 
some of the recent consumer filings represented debtors who encountered 
economic crises (including medical and divorce-related expenses or expenses 
caused by job dislocations) largely beyond their control.I09 Moreover, while 
some debtors may strategically manipulate bankruptcy laws to amass ex-
can make it from one paycheck to the next.fl); Beatrice E. Garcia, Lay the Cards on the 'Table, MIAMI 
HERALD, Mar. 11 1999, at 1 C (observing that the increase in bankruptcy filings during a period of low 
unemployment ~[o]n the face of it, it doesn't seem to make sense.fl); Kenneth R. Gosselin & Dan Haar,Easy 
Credit Boosts Boom and Bust Personal Bani{ruptdes on the Rise, HARTFORD CouRANT, Mar. 7, 1999, at 
A1 (noting dichotomy of plentiful jobs, low inflation and interest rates, and record level bankruptcy 
filings). 
107]ones & Zywicki, supra note 77, at 214·15 (attributing increase to people becoming ~more aware of 
how to plan strategically for bankruptcyfl); Editorial, Bani{ruptcy and Responsibility, CHRISTIAN SciENCE 
MoNITOR, May 20, 1999, at 10 (suggesting that increase in bankruptcy filings evidences that it is too easy 
for individuals to declare bankruptcy). 
One prominent economist has observed that the increase in consumer filings is easily explained by the 
increased availability of credit card debt and the resulting credit card default rate. See Lawrence M. 
Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults. Credit Card Profits, and Bani{ruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249 (1997). 
108See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, 'Ta~ing the New Consumer Bani{ruptcy Mode/for 
a 'Test Drive: Means- 'Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. lNsT. L. REv. 27, 32 (1999) (observ· 
ing that all empirical studies agreed that the ~vast m~.jority of chapter 7 debtors belong in that chapter.fl). 
Indeed, recent research suggests that most debtors are solidly in the middle-class. See TERESA A. SULLI-
VAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 32·36 (2000) (hereinafter FRAGILE 
MIDDLE CLASS). 
109See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 108, at 16; Cf REPORT, supra note 98, 
at 84 (noting difficulty in giving general reasons for financial problems because individual reasons vary on 
circumstances but suggesting that many filings occur after the debtor loses a job, is divorced, or has a 
medical catastrophe); In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 230 n. 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) \Medical problems 
represent the most common form of calamity that causes economic problems and persistently impairs a 
debtor's ability to pay debtsfl); Jagdeep S. Bhandar & Lawrence A. Weiss, 'The Increasing Bani{ruptcy 
Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.]. 1, 7·8 (1993) (discussing study that found that, 
while divorce was not significantly related to bankruptcy filings, divorce affects an individual's capacity to 
service debt and debt servicing is significantly related to bankruptcy filings.); Higgins, supra note 80, at 76 
(commenting on filings triggered when a overburdened debtor is ~blindsidedfl by a job loss, divorce, health 
or other unexpected expenses); Christine Dugas, Special Report: Going Bro~e, USA ToDAY, June 10, 
1997, at 1A (citing poll results that suggest that job loss, divorce, and medical expenses frequently push 
debtors into filings for bankruptcy); Lisa Fickenscher, Bani{ruptdes Fall; Warning Flags Still Fly, AM. 
BANKER, Apr. 15, 1999, at 1 (citing findings by market research group that unemployment, medical debts, 
gambling, lawyer advertising, and loss of stigma fueled growth of consumer filings); Pae & Stoughton, supra 
note 98, at A1 (discussing debtor who filed because of medical expenses that were not covered because she 
was never employed long enough to collect health insurance and married couple who filed for bankruptcy 
after their income was reduced by one-third after the wife unexpectedly was laid off). 
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emptible assets and incur dischargeable debts, potentially just as many others 
became hopelessly overburdened with debt because of their financial 
naivete.l 10 
Though not all debtors are frauds, it is impossible to deny that at least 
some debtors have an extravagant lifestyle111 and attempt to use bankruptcy 
laws to subsidize the costs associated with that lifestyle.112 Similarly, it is 
likely that-if current laws remain-some high-income debtors will file for 
bankruptcy once they realize (or are told) that bankruptcy laws let them keep 
some expensive assets but discharge many (or most) of their debts.113 Cur-
110See REPORT, supra note 98, at 93 (suggesting Congress look into certain credit industry practices 
such as targeting young people and those with low income); Julie Kosterlit~, Over the Edge, 29 NAT'L J. 
870, 870 (1997) (discussing mother who used her benefits from Aid To Families with Dependent Children 
to pay her minimum credit card bills); John Schmeluer, Credit Easy; Banl(ruptcy Easy; Lessons Come 
Harder, CHI. TRm~ Oct. 10, 1996, at 1 (reporting on couple who sought credit counseling when they 
accumulated debt once again after filing for bankruptcy); Gene Tharps, Students: Beware the credit card 
trap, ATL. J & CoNSTITUTION, Sep. 27, 1998 at R8 (citing consumer group report that only twenty 
percent of students knew how long it would take to pay off credit card debt if they make only the monthly 
minimum payment). Recent litigation involving Sears and other major retail stores revealed that some 
debtors agreed to repay fairly s~eable debts in return for the retailer's promise to extend them a nominal 
line of credit even though the reaffirmation agreements obligated them to pay actual annual percentage 
rates as high as 124.2%. See In re B~zese, 214 B.R. 444, 448 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
111See In re Rembert 141 F.3d 277 {6th Cir. 1998) (stating debtor filed for bankruptcy after using 
credit card to get cash advances for gambling purposes) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998); In re Melancon 
223 B.R. 300, 304 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998) (reporting debtor accumulated over $35,000 in credit card debt 
with all but approximately $100 representing gambling losses); In re Motaharnia, 215 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting debtor had over $100,000 debt from sixteen unpaid credit card balances); In re 
Uddin. 196 B.R.19, 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reporting debtor misrepresented income to get credit 
cards, charged $60,000 in perfume, electronics and other luxury items, then filed for bankruptcy); Dan 
Herbeck & Michael Beebe, 'The Buc~s Stop Here. Court Won't Erase Couple's Huge Credit Card Debt, 
BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 29, 1998, at A1 (discussing couple who amassed $336,328 on 59 credit cards for 
home renovations); John O'Brien, Court Cler~ Lived High Before Fall, PosT-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), 
Oct. 20, 1997, at A1 (reporting on local court clerk who amassed $47,000 credit card bill in luxury items 
and travel expenses, then filed for bankruptcy). 
112See, e.g., In re McNichols, 249 B.R. 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (commenting on the debtor's ~opu· 
lent lifestyle~ and her proposed ~parsimonious payment~ to unsecured creditors); In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 
27, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that debtor engaged in excessive spending prepetition and that she 
chose to allow her creditors to ~fund~ her extravagant lifestyle); In re Lewis, 227 B.R. 886, 889 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ark. 1998) (finding debtor's ~sole motive in filing~ was to circumvent state court alimony and child 
support orders); In re Emge, 226 B.R. 396, 400 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition 
after the debtor rejected the court's ~admonishment~ to reduce monthly 401K retirement contributions, 
cease paying the graduate school expenses of an adult child, and lease a less expensive car). 
113See REPORT, supra note 98, at 81 (describing such practices as some of~the most egregious examples 
of abuse~ in the bankruptcy system); Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Lang, 898 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Fla. 
1995) (reporting that debtors moved from New Jersey to Florida then purchased, and were allowed to 
keep, a home and annuities with a combined value of one million dollars); In re Primack, 89 B.R. 954 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (noting that debtors exempted a $450,000 house even though they purchased it 
sixteen months before they filed for bankruptcy and they moved to Florida from a state that had a limited 
homestead exemption). 
Debtors in some states can exempt a homestead of unlimited value. See, e.g., TEx. PROP. CoDE ANN. 
§ 41.002 (West Supp. 1997). See also Border v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel II), 70 F. 3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 
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rent laws appear to allow some unscrupulous debtors to engage in opportu-
nistic behavior to ensure that all needy debtors are allowed to discharge 
burdensome debts. Just as T ANF created a zero tolerance policy that im-
posed numerous reporting requirements on benefit recipient and mandated 
that they work, the proposed bankruptcy reforms appear designed to prevent 
all opportunistic behavior even if the reformed system prevents some truly 
deserving debtors from discharging their debts. 
2. Ban~ruptcy Stigma 
Critics also blame the increase in individual filings on changes in cultural 
mores which have de-stigmatized filing for bankruptcy.ll4 Specifically, sup-
porters of bankruptcy reform argue that making bankruptcy a value-free sys-
tem has caused debtors to breach the trust inherent in credit and lending 
arrangements and has convinced some debtors that they no longer have a 
moral duty to pay their debts.ll5 Debtors' unwillingness to work to repay 
their bills is not surprising, critics contend, because Americans no longer feel 
constrained by the cultural mores of the last generation.U6 
Three events, rare during the 1950s but now quite common, are cited to 
prove the shift in cultural mores: divorces, bankruptcies, and unwed 
pregnancies.117 Notwithstanding rhetoric used during welfare reform de-
bates and recent bankruptcy reform hearings, it is impossible to conclusively 
prove why there has been an increase in these three activities. The increases 
most often are attributed to changes in the positive laws that govern these 
1995) ("[W]e must uphold and enforce the Texas homestead laws even though in so doing we might 
unwittingly-or even knowingly but powerless to avoid it-'assist a dishonest debtor in wrongfully de-
feating his creditor.' This may account for the oft-repeated creditor's lament: 'Debtors either die or move 
to Texas.~) ( footnotes omitted). 
114Frum, supra note 6, at A14 ("It's not a coincidence that this weakening of the sense of fmancial 
obligation occurred just [as] Americans were diminishing their feelings of obligation to family, community 
and nation.~); Editorial, supra note 5 (arguing that filing increase ~represent[ ] a damaging cultural shift 
toward irresponsibility.~). 
115While debtors are accused of violating their moral duty to repay their debts, critics rarely suggest 
that bankruptcy laws impose moral duty on creditors who lend to these debtors. Cf Shuchman, supra 
note 7, at 435: 
[I]f the creditor-debtor relationship is founded in morality, surely the creditor as 
well as the debtor must consider the moral consequences of insisting upon payment. 
Is it not immoral for the creditor to enforce payment though he or it knows (and on 
moral grounds should inquire) that the debtor's family will suffer thereby? 
116]ack F. Williams, Distrust: 'The Rhetoric and Reality of Means· 'Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. 
REv. 105, 107 (1999) (~Those who scorn the massive increase in bankruptcy filings believe the increase is 
a direct result of lax moral standards and a culture of tolerance.~). 
117See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 77, at 216; Allen M. Parkman, 'The Dischargeability of Post· 
Divorce Finandal Obligations Between Spouses: Insights from Banl(ruptcy in Business Situations, 31 FAM. 
L.Q. 493, 495 (1997); Megan Weinstein, 'The 'Teenage Pregnancy ·Problem·: Welfare Reform and the 
Personal Responsibility and Wor~ Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WoMEN's LJ. 
117, 132 (1998). 
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events, easier access to legal assistance and the judicial system, and to the 
decline in shame and stigma associated with the events.U8 The most often 
cited cause is the purported loss of stigma. Though critics claim that the 
stigma previously associated (or claimed to be associated) with filing for 
bankruptcy has all but disappeared, it is virtually impossible to substantiate 
that claim. That is, it is hard to determine whether people ever viewed bank-
ruptcy as a stigmatizing event, whether they no longer view bankruptcy as a 
stigmatizing event, or whether any decline in this purported bankruptcy 
shame or stigma has caused more people to file for bankruptcy.U9 
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, industry critics seem willing to virtually ig-
nore the effect that bankruptcy filings of large, essentially solvent corpora-
tions may have had on the purported decline of bankruptcy stigma.120 
118See Higgins, supra note 80, at 75 (noting bankruptcy's diminishing social stigma as filings have 
become more common); France, supra note 100, at A23 (citing Republican allegation that declining bank-
ruptcy stigma created ~an epidemic of cavalier 'bankruptcies of conveniencem); Editorial, MaJting it Harder 
to Dodge Debts, RoANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, May 14, 1999, at A14 rBankruptcy, much like 
unwed pregnancy, seems to have no stigma of shame attached to it these days.~); Jacob M. Schlesinger, 
House Approves Banl{ruptcy Overhaul Amid Criticism Bill May Be 'Too 'Tough, WALL ST.]., at A28, May 
6, 1999 (reporting that lenders and legislators blame the decline in bankruptcy stigma for the filing surge); 
Editorial, 'Today's Scarlet Letter, Easy Credit: Banl{ruptcy May N.o Longer Carry a Stigma with Creditors 
but it Might with Employers, BALTIMORE SuN, May 7, 1999, at 24A rJust as failed marriages no longer 
carry a social stigma, personal bankruptcy no longer is an impediment to obtaining credit in the future). 
119See Howard, supra note 85, at 1061 (noting woeful lack of empirical data to support the ~psycholog­
ical dimension of bankruptcy known as stigma~); Shuchman, supra note 7, at 469 (observing lack of evi-
dence to support ~the conjecture that any single filing of a petition in bankruptcy will weaken the will of 
others or help to or tend to bring about many more bankruptcies~); Douglas R. Rendleman, Banl{ruptcy 
Revision: Procedure and Process, 53 N.C. L. REv. 1197, 1231 (1975) rEveryone talks about the stigma, 
but no one analy~es it very thoroughly.~). But see Jones & Zywicki, supra note 77, at 216·17 (discussing 
studies that suggest that stigma is a variable that affects a debtor's decision to file for bankruptcy). 
Similarly, while lawyer advertising may have facilitated some debtors' decisions to file for bankruptcy, 
it is hard to determine whether increased access to legal assistance necessarily increases bankruptcy filings, 
especially since many debtors cannot afford to hire a bankruptcy lawyer and cannot proceed in forma 
pauperis in bankruptcy proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1930(a) (1994). See also Samuelson, supra 
note 94, at A17 (blaming increased fllings on aggressive lawyer advertisements); Jones & Zywicki, supra 
note 77, at 218 (suggesting that lawyers' ads in the phone book help fuel ~an active bankruptcy culture~); 
'Testimony of the American Banl{ruptcy Institute on Consumer Debt, Delinquencies and Personal Banl{rupt-
des: Hearing Before the Committee on BanJting and Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
(Sept. 12, 1996) <http://www.abiworld.org/legis/testimony/12sep96.html> (statement of Ford El-
saesser, Vice-President of the American Bankruptcy Institute) (noting ~secular change in attitude toward 
debt and personal responsibility~ and fact the perception that ~there is no shame in debt any more; the 
stigma associated with bankruptcy has largely disappeared~ in part because of the ~growth in lawyer 
advertising promising that you may be able to 'keep everything' and 'pay back nothingm). But see Another 
View of Why Banl{ruptdes are Increasing, 34 No. 4, BANKR. CT. DECS. WKLY. NEws & COMMENTS 
(LRP) A1, May 4, 1999 (noting that prominent market research firm admitted to a lack of data to support 
theory that the reduction in bankruptcy stigma or the increase in lawyer advertising caused the increase in 
consumer filings). 
120See Steven L. Schwarc~ & Janet Malloy Link, Protecting Rights, Preventing Windfalls: A Model for 
Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L. REv. 403, 431 n. 117 (1997) (discussing 
bankruptcy fllings of Dow Corning, Texaco, and Johns-Manville). Cf Terry Savage, Bill would toughen 
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Instead, critics cite the presence of celebrity bankruptcy filings121 to support 
their claim that only abusive consumer filings have caused the erosion of the 
stigma previously attached to filing for bankruptcy. While critics stress the 
need to stigmatize debtors, they have identified nothing that would actually 
reintroduce stigma or make someone feel ashamed that she filed for bank-
ruptcy.122 Instead, just as welfare reformers argued that making it harder to 
receive public assistance benefits would-alone-stigmatize the recipients of 
those benefits, critics of the current bankruptcy system seem to believe that 
simply making it harder to discharge debts will stigmatize debtors. 
C. INTRODUCING RECIPROCAL PRINCIPLES IN BANKRUPTCY 
No empirical evidence or opinion poll suggests that the public wants to 
prevent the truly deserving from discharging their debts in bankruptcy. In-
stead, it appears that people have become hostile toward the bankruptcy sys-
tem in general, and debtors in particular, because they think that (1) filing for 
bankruptcy has become too easy and current laws impose no burdens (like 
attempting to repay bills) on debtors and (2) debtors view the discharge as if 
it is an unearned entitlement that gives them the right to demand that wealth 
be redistributed from members of the responsible debt-paying public to the 
members of irresponsible debt-discharging public. Since the public's views of 
the importance of providing bankruptcy relief to the economically disabled is 
consistent with their views of providing welfare relief to the economically 
banl{ruptcy rules, CHICAGO SUN·TIMES, May 11, 2000, at 66 (suggesting that the old moral arguments 
against bankruptcy are no longer effective because the filings of major corporations and entertainers have 
erased the stigma of filing for bankruptcy). 
121See In re Brown, 211 B.R. 183, 184 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (reporting bankruptcy filing of recording 
artist Rachelle Ferrell); Higgins, supra note 80, at 74 (reporting that critics argue that bankruptcy filings of 
the rich and famous prove that lax legal standards permit people with means to avoid repaying legitimate 
debts); Henry]. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Banl{ruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit, 27 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 33,34 (1998) (discussing bankruptcy filings of Willie Nelson, Kim Basinger, Burt Reyn· 
olds, and Toni Braxton); Christine Dugas, Should Debtors Be Able to Keep Homes? Critics Say Banl{ruptcy 
Loophole Aids the Rich, USA ToDAY, June 26, 2000, at lOB (citing examples of well·to-do·debtors, includ· 
ing former Texas Governor John Connally, who took advantage of unlimited homestead exemptions); 
Editorial, Lax banl{ruptcy laws ma~e everyone pay, USA ToDAY, june 12, 1997, at 14A (noting bankruptcy 
filings of former baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, former Amona Governor Fife Symington, and Wall 
Street financier Paul Bilzerian); Tonya Pendleton, 'The Price of Fame can be Banl{ruptcy, THE RECORD 
(Bergan County, NJ), Apr. 11, 1998, at Y1 (reporting the bankruptcy filings of recording artists MC 
Hammer and TLC); Higgins, supra note 80, at 74 (characterizing ~going broke~ as the ~best career move in 
show business.~). 
122Though not publicly advocated during the last reform efforts, Congress could amend or repeal the 
anti-discrimination protections provided in § 525 of the Code. Allowing employers to refuse to hire, to 
demote, or to terminate people simply because they filed for bankruptcy certainly would serve to reintro· 
duce stigma. At least one person recently lost a high·profile employment opportunity because she and her 
husband had filed for bankruptcy after amassing over $850,000 in debt. See Bernard Dagenais, Banl{ruptcy: 
N.ot ~uite a Free Ride, WAsH. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at D3 (discussing former debtor who withdrew 
application for superintendent of a suburban District of Columbia school system because of furor over 
credit card debts she incurred before she filed for bankruptcy). 
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disabled, it is likely that the public wants to reform the bankruptcy system to 
force debtors to modify their future spending, to repay more of their debts, 
and to ensure that they understand that the government has the right to 
scrutinize their personal lives and impose behavioral modifications.123 
Debtors, like husbandless mothers, are no longer viewed as economic vic-
tims. The manner in which means-tested aid to families has been transformed 
suggests that, unless the public thinks recipients have "'earned" the right to 
receive economic assistance from the government, the benefits they receive 
will be means-tested and will not be viewed as entitlements. Indeed, the 
structure of T ANF exhibits the current philosophical (and political) ap-
proach toward awarding federal benefits.124 Moreover, rhetoric used during 
welfare reform debates, and the ultimate structure of the T ANF program, 
indicates that reciprocal principles-the notion that recipients must do some-
thing in exchange for benefits-will be the philosophical underpinning of all 
public assistance programs. Given these changes in the public view toward 
government assistance to the needy, it is not surprising that critics are de-
manding a means-tested bankruptcy system. 
D. JusTIFICATION FOR MEANs-TESTING 
The purported abuses of the current bankruptcy system caused Congress 
to pass legislation that means-tests bankruptcy relief. The view that the sys-
tem is in a crisis and needs to be be radically altered is somewhat surprising 
given the findings of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the 
"'Commission")P5 Congress asked the Commission to consider whether ex-
isting bankruptcy laws and practices encourage people to overspend then 
seek to discharge their debts. When the Commission was appointed, Con-
123Welfare public opinion polls never suggested that the public felt that the government had no duty 
to support the poor or that the public's primary concern was the cost of supporting poor people. Instead, 
public perception polls indicated that the public's primary concern with, and objection to, the old welfare 
system was that it created and encouraged deviant behavioral patterns. SeeR. Kent Weaver et al., Public 
Opinion on Welfare Reform: A Mandate For What?, in LooKING BEFORE WE LEAP: SociAL SCIENCE 
AND WELFARE REFORM 109, 112 (R. Kent Weaver and William T. Dickens eds., 1995). Specifically, 
these polls suggested that, when considering various welfare reforms, the public was more concerned with 
having a system that encouraged the importance of work, made users self-sufficient, and ended long·term 
dependency rather than a system that saved money or reduced the federal budget deficit. See id. at 115. 
124Using TANF to reduce welfare rolls and make poor mothers earn their benefits by working in the 
labor market is now the prevailing view even though the program may force poor mothers into a contin-
gent workforce that will provide an uncertain employment future during slow economic times. See Pro-
tecting Employment Rights, supra note 29, at 904. 
125The Commission consisted of nationally recogn~ed bankruptcy experts, including prominent law-
yers and judges, a certified public accountant, and a former member of Congress. They were appointed in 
a bipartisan process by the President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the majority and 
minority leadership of each house of Congress. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 
tit. VI,§ 604, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147 (National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act). For a comprehen-
sive description of the history of the Commission, see REPORT, supra note 98, at 57-75. 
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gress indicated that it was "'generally satisfied" with bankruptcy laws.126 
The Commission, while acknowledging that the bankruptcy system is not 
perfect and needed minor reforms, 127 concluded that imposing means or in-
come based restrictions was not warranted because the vast majority of peo-
ple who filed for bankruptcy lacked income sufficient to repay their 
unsecured debts.128 Although this is now the second bankruptcy commission 
that has rejected means-testing, 129 recent legislative efforts all but guarantee 
that future debt-relief will be means-tested. 
Making bankruptcy a means-tested system has been the primary goal of 
bankruptcy reform efforts for the last three years.13° Critics cited the dra-
matic overall increase in individual bankruptcy filings, the highly publicized 
bankruptcy filings of the rich and famous, and filings by debtors who amassed 
substantial credit card debts by purchasing lavish goods to support their con-
tention that people with means are using bankruptcy as a financial planning 
tool rather than as a tool of last resort. 131 
Though bankruptcy relief typically is not referred to as a federal public 
126H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 59 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3340, 3368. In appointing 
the Commission, Congress stated that it intended the Commission to review, improve, and update bank-
ruptcy laws ~in ways which do not disturb the fundamental tenets and balance of current law.~ Id. 
127See REPORT, supra note 98, at 79-82 (discussing the need for consumer bankruptcy reform in order 
to improve its integrity, efficiency, and fairness). 
128See REPORT, supra note 98, at 83. See also Editorial, 'Today"s Scarlet Letter, Easy Credit: Ban~­
ruptcy May N.o Longer Carry a Stigma with Creditors but it might with Employers, BALT. SuN, supra note 
ll8, at 24A (discussing Commissions's findings). 
1290ver twenty-five years ago, another bankruptcy commission (also appointed in a bipartisan fashion 
and consisting of bankruptcy experts) analy~ed and recommended changes to the then existing bankruptcy 
laws. This commission also considered, but ultimately rejected, forced contributions from future income 
(i.e., means-testing) and concluded that there was not rampant abuse of bankruptcy laws. See REPORT Of 
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS Of THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 54, 159 (1973). 
130See Corrine Ball & Jacqueline B. Stuart, 'The Battle Over Ban~ruptcy Law for the N.ew Millennium, 
55 Bus. Law. 1487 (2000) (stating that the ~drive~ to pass reform was sparked by the large increase in 
consumer filings despite a sustained strong economy); Dewar & Day, supra note 102, at Al (observing that 
Senate-approved legislation was sought by the credit card industry); Henry ]. Sommer, Opposition to 
Reform Legislation Grows in Senate, NAT'L L.]., Sep. 28, 1998, at B6 (noting that the credit industry 
lobbying and public relations campaign portray the ~primary issue~ as whether debtors with the ability to 
repay debts should be forced to do so); ABI DEBATE, supra note 91, at 6 (statement of George Wallace, 
representing the American Financial Services Association, stating that many who file for Chapter 7 actu· 
ally have the ability to pay thirty to forty percent of their unsecured debts, and therefore should be 
required to do so); Dorothy Eisenberg, Consumer Debtors: Combining Chapters 7 and 13,4 AM. BANKR. 
INsT. L.]. 5ll, 5ll (1996) (arguing that Chapters 7 and 13 should be combined to encourage debtors to 
repay some of their debt from future earnings). 
131See, e.g., Jamie Clary, Bill Would Ma~e it Harder to Wipe Away Ban~ptcy Debt, NAsH. Bus. J., 
Apr. 17, 1998, at 9 (quoting statement by general counsel of the Tennessee Bankers Association that 
~Bankruptcy is no longer a last resort. It has become a first resort.~); Editorial, supra note ll8, at A14 
(contending that affluent Americans use bankruptcy as an option of first resort and view it as an invest-
ment strategy or financial planning tool). 
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assistance program, 132 the arguments advanced to support means-testing are 
consistent with the philosophy that public programs should stress mutual 
obligations that require the benefit recipient to do something (or refrain from 
doing something) in return for receiving benefits. For debtors, this "'some-
thing" would be agreeing to sacrifice to repay as many of his debts as possible 
and to curtail his future credit habits. Moreover, arguments raised during 
recent attempts to reform consumer bankruptcy laws suggest that policymak-
ers think that the bankruptcy system (like the new T ANF program) should 
be used to control the behavior of benefit recipients. 
Though specific means-testing proposals were highly controversial, 133 the 
concept of means-testing is relatively simple. In general, means-testing will 
prevent debtors from discharging debts in Chapter 7 if they are deemed to 
have the current or future means to repay a certain percentage of those debts 
in a Chapter 13 plan.134 Under the bills most recently considered by Con-
gress, a debtor will be deemed to have the means to repay his bills if applying 
a statutorily prescribed formula indicates that (1) his income exceeds a cer-
tain state or national average and (2) after deducting expenses (also deter-
mined by a state/national figure) and certain debt payments, he can repay a 
certain percentage of unsecured claims within the next five years.135 . Oppo-
nents of recent means-testing opponents reject these proposals as unneces-
sary136 because most judges already have the ability to prevent abusive 
filings, 137 because the majority of debtors appear to be genuinely unable to 
132A bankruptcy professional recently referred to bankruptcy as a ~social welfare program~ and a 
~system that provides a welfare benefit~ at a public debate on Capitol Hill. See ABI DEBATE, supra note 
91, at 6. Likewise, in a dissent to the Commission's Report, several of the Commissioners referred to 
bankruptcy as ~a social welfare program ... subsid~ed by creditors.~ See Report, supra note 98, Recom· 
mendation for Reform of Consumer Banl{ruptey Law By Four Dissenting Commissioners, at 15; see also 
Schlesinger, supra note 118, at A1 (noting the credit industry's character~ation of bankruptcy filers as 
~the 1990s version of President Reagan's 'welfare queens' ... ~). 
133For a particularly vitriolic critique of the views expressed by the opponents of means-testing, see 
Jones & Zywicki, supra note 77, at 178 (characterizing views as ~overwrought responses~ and expressing 
concern that ~well-known academics and bankruptcy specialists have chosen to oppose means•testing vis• 
cerally~); id. at 207 (character~ing views as ~[a]pocalyptic rhetoric~). 
134See H.R. 3150, at § 101. 
135See 5.420, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001); H.R. 333, at § 102. For a more extensive discussion of 
means-testing proposals, see Klein, supra note 4, at 714·28. 
136I include myself as one of those opponents, as I am one of the bankruptcy professors who signed a 
letter that opposed recent legislation. See Bankruptcy Professors September 7, 1999 letter to Senate 
judiciary Committee, available at http://www.abiworld.org/legis/profcrit.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2001). 
137Some critics of means•testing, including bankruptcy judges, argue that amending the Code to explic· 
itly provide for means-testing is unnecessary, as Section 707(b) of the Code already gives judges the 
authority to force debtors with means repay their bills. See, e.g., Leif M. Clark, 'The Responsible Borrower 
Protection Act: A N.ot·So·Responsible Effort at Protecting Borrowers, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 741, 749·50 
(discussing proposed means-testing bills and noting that it was ~unclear whether the newly proposed 
legislation needlessly reinvents the wheel, simply codifies existing practice, or attempts to micromanage 
bankruptcy judges' adjudication of specific cases by providing statutory 'bright lines' for eligibility~). 
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pay their debts, 138 and because Chapter 13 plans already have a high failure 
rate.139 
III. BANKRUPTCY'S ROLE IN THE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
SYSTEM 
Because the ability to file for bankruptcy has never been a guaranteed 
right, 14° it is not surprising that critics are troubled by the recent dramatic 
increase in bankruptcy filings and by the Code's apparent inability to curb 
the increase. Moreover, because the Code theoretically allows debtors to 
discharge their debts even though they may have income available to pay 
those debts, it is not surprising the critics feel that the Code gives debtors 
the right to force others (i.e., their creditors) to provide economic support.l41 
Similarly, given the recent assault on entitlement politics, it is not surprising 
that critics of the Code feel that it has caused debtors to lose their sense of 
personal and social responsibility and to engage in bankruptcy opportunism. 
Given the shift in the philosophical views toward entitlement programs, the 
ability to discharge debts in bankruptcy will not be construed as an entitle-
ment. Since, however, discharging debts provides an economic benefit to 
debtors, the bankruptcy system should be treated as one that provides public 
assistance benefits. 
Though recent means-testing proposals may have made unrealistic eco-
nomic assumptions, 14 2 implementing a means-test that prospectively assesses 
138See Braucher, supra note 4, at 3·6 (noting that debtors with high debt·income ratios are filing for 
bankruptcy); REPORT, supra note 98, at 90 (discussing testimony that use of means·testing ~would fall 
hardest on families already financially pressed past the breaking point, with little provable benefit~). 
139See Braucher, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Commission's finding that the failure rate for Chapter 13 
plans ~exceeds 60 percent~); Gary Klein, Consumer Banl{ruptcy in the Balance: 'The :National Banl{ruptcy 
Review Commission's Recommendations 'Tilt 'Toward Creditors, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 293, 322 
(1997) (observing that due to the ~substantial commitment~ required by a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor 
must enter the plan voluntarily or it will have ~little chance of success~). See also In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 
180, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that debtors fail to complete Chapter 13 plan payments because 
~[l]ife is full of surprises. Unanticipated expenses are the rule rather than the exception.~). 
140See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446·47 (1973) (holding that there is no constitutional or 
statutory right to bankruptcy relief). But cf. Rendleman, supra note 119, at 1231·35 (suggesting that 
reformers explore welfare analogies because of similarities between bankruptcy and other welfare pro· 
grams); Samuelson, supra note 94, at A17 (character~ing bankruptcy as ~an informal welfare program for 
the lower middle class.~). 
141See Consumer Bankruptcy Subcommittee of the Committee on Consumer Financial Services 
(ABA), Report and Recommendations, 2 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 239, 259 (1982) \[B]ankruptcy relief is not 
something which should be available for the asking. Instead, it is a form of equitable relief which should be 
justified by the exigencies of the consumer's fmancial condition.~); Theodore Eisenberg, Banl{ruptcy Law in 
Perspective, 28 U.C.LA. L. REV. 953, 977 (1981) \[A] bankruptcy discharge should not be available 
merely upon request. There would be obvious disincentives to perform contracts. In theory at least, our 
law has never endorsed such a lenient rule. Debtors are always asked to sacrifice something, to pay what 
they reasonably can.~). 
142See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 4, at 1 (characterizing means·testing proposals as unrealistic and uncle· 
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whether a debtor's household income is sufficient to help him repay his bills is 
consistent with means-tests imposed in other nonentitlement federal assis-
tance programs. That is, a properly crafted means-test would prevent all 
undeserving debtors from discharging their debts just as T ANF appears to 
have prevented nondeserving mothers from receiving welfare benefits.143 
Moreover, imposing a means test would signal that bankruptcy relief (like 
welfare relief) is not an entitlement. Finally, means-testing is consistent with 
the principle of reciprocity because it would impose on debtors the burden of 
making financial sacrifices and relying on other economic sources (including 
their own future income) to repay their debts in return for receiving the 
benefit of discharging debts they lack the means to repay. 
Just as welfare reforms sought to ensure that public assistance programs 
both awarded benefits and helped rehabilitate benefit recipients, a means-
tested bankruptcy system should do more than just make it more burdensome 
to discharge debts. To make bankruptcy an effective means-tested system 
that imposes burdens designed to rehabilitate the benefit recipient, it must 
help debtors avoid a future financial crisis. Current bankruptcy laws do not, 
and are not designed to, reform or modify debtors' behavior. For example, 
people who discharge their debts are not required to participate in any con-
sumer budgeting classes (and the system would not pay for such classes even 
if a debtor wanted to attend them). Likewise, the bankruptcy system does 
not mandate that debtors be told that they should consider consulting organi-
:z;ations outside the bankruptcy system to help them understand why they 
ended up deeply in debt. Current reforms condition bankruptcy relief on a 
debtor's willingness to obtain prepetition or postpetition credit counseling.144 
veloped); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, 'T al(ing the N.ew Consumer Banl{ruptcy Model jOT a 
'Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 DebtOTs, 7 AM. BANKR.!NST. L. REv. 27, 31 (1999) (charac• 
teming assumptions as overly optimistic and unrealistic). 
143While ending welfare as we knew it caused welfare caseloads to decline, it does not appear to have 
ensured that poor mothers have become economically self-sufficient. See Alissa]. Rubin, 'Ma~e WOT~ Pay,' 
And Kids Benefit; Study: Children Showed Improvements in School, Health and BehaviOT When 'Their 
WOT~ing Parents Received Cash Supplements, Welfare-Ref= RepOTt Says, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2001, at AlO (discussing a repon that suggests that if lawmakers want welfare to do more than reduce the 
amount of money government spends on the poor and move people into low-wage jobs, it must make a 
concened effon to help augment poor families' incomes); Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare RefOTm, 
and the Minority Poor: Accounting jOT the 'Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 552, 607 
(1999) (citing research that indicates that a large percentage of welfare recipients who have left the 
TANF rolls are not employed); GAO repon, supra note 44, at 96 (admitting there is a lack of consensus 
about the extent to which economic growth and state welfare reforms caused the decline in welfare 
caseloads); Bill Archer, Op-Ed, Welfare Ref='s Unprecedented Success, WASH. PosT, Aug. 10, 1998, at 
A17 (citing changes in values and expectations as well as finding work as reasons for the decline in the 
welfare rolls). 
144See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, § 106, 
107th Cong. (2001). While virtually everyone supports the concept of debtor education, it is unclear who 
is best qualified to educate debtors or what type of education should be provided. A report on debtor 
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Even if bankruptcy critics are correct in their belief that debtors need to 
radically alter their general philosophy about the importance of repaying their 
debts, however, debtors need to be told more than the necessity of budgeting 
or using credit cards responsibly because they become economically disabled 
for a number of reasons. 
Means-tested bankruptcy relief will be virtually useless unless the re· 
formed bankruptcy system provides meaningful credit and noncredit assis· 
tance to working poor debtors. 145 At a bare minimum, debtors should be 
taught how to use credit responsibly and should be warned of the dangers 
associated with using credit cards. Meaningful bankruptcy reform must man-
date that debtors participate in programs (educational or otherwise) that ex-
plain why they should not accept the twelfth credit card offer they receive 
that month, should never carry a credit card balance, should never apply for a 
credit card that charges an annual fee, should ignore credit card machines in 
casinos, should not purchase expensive shoes marketed by famous athletes, 
should never take out a high interest "'cash advance" loan, etc. 
Given the dire financial straits some debtors face, it is questionable 
whether they would accept this "lifestyle" advice even if it is presented to 
them. Moreover, it may be impossible to teach people to avoid overspending, 
given the bombardment of daily advertising to spend, spend, spend that the 
typical citizen sees in both the print and broadcast media, and increasingly in 
nontraditional mediums like the internet. Moreover, it is virtually guaran· 
teed that the credit card lobby will prevent any educational reform that en· 
courages people to significantly reduce their credit card use.146 One 
education submitted to the Commission noted that ~it is hard to be against debtor education-it would be 
like being against apple pie.~ REPORT, supra note 98, (statement of Professor Karen Gross), Appendix G-
3.a, at 2. Indeed, the same issues involving the need for debtor education expressed recently have been 
discussed numerous times during past bankruptcy reforms. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 85, at 1060 
(discussing recent 1984 amendments to the Code and noting that ~budget counseling should be provided in 
an effort to counter the 'mismanagement, ineptitude, and extravagance' at the root of most consumer 
bankruptcies~) (citation omitted). 
145Though I generally agree that debtor education is worthwhile, I argue in another context that 
education that focuses narrowly on budgeting ultimately will fail to cure the perceived bankruptcy ~prob­
lem.~ See A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be 'Taught? Why Credit-Focused Debtor 
Education May Not War~, 32 LoY. LA. L. REv. 945 (1999). 
146While the credit industry supports debtor education that tells debtors that they should attempt to 
repay their debts, it has defeated all attempts to force credit card issuers to clearly explain how much it 
will actually cost a borrower if the borrower pays only the minimum monthly payment on her credit card 
bill. See Editorial, Bad Bill for a Real Problem, BuFFALO NEws, Oct. 19, 2000, at 4B (discussing industry's 
successful attempt to prevent requiring credit card issuers to explain how long it would take a debtor to 
repay a bill it she only paid the minimum monthly payment). This is not surprising, as it actually is not in 
the industry's self-interest to give debtors a candid assessment of the pitfalls of making full use of a credit 
card. That is, the credit industry profits when consumers behave somewhat recklessly given the exorbi· 
tant interest rates some credit card issuers charge and the substantial profit they make when consumers 
charge a lot then pay only the minimum monthly payments. See Nelson D. Schwart:z; & Scott Medint:z;, 
Credit Chec~, SMARTMONEY, Feb. 1, 1997, Vo. IV, No. II, at 110 (citing the ~onerous~ 19.2% interest 
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indication of the profits the industry potentially stands to lose if consumers 
decided, en masse, to charge only what they can afford to pay each month is 
the recent threat by some credit card issuers to impose a monthly fee on the 
accounts of credit card holders who fail to carry a monthly balance.147 
As using credit irresponsibly is not the only reason people resort to filing 
for bankruptcy, having a greater understanding of the importance of debt 
repayment will not help all debtors and will not necessarily prevent them 
from misusing credit in the future. Debtors who find themselves unable to 
pay their bills because they are unable to collect court-ordered child support 
or cannot find jobs that pay them wages sufficient to support their families 
may in fact use credit rationally, even though they know that they cannot 
afford to pay those debts. That is, debtors who understand the importance of 
paying their bills may at times choose to incur credit card bills they know 
they cannot repay if they conclude that medical or divorce expenses, or a loss 
of income due to under- or unemployment give them no other viable eco-
nomic options. Imposing a means-test that merely prevents some debtors 
from discharging their debts will not solve the bankruptcy crisis (assuming 
one exists) unless the means-tested system also provides noncredit focused 
assistance, like how to get a better job or one that provides health insurance, 
how to collect child support payments, why you should resist the lure of 
credit card advertising, etc.148 While T ANF allows states to provide child 
rate of Bfs Wholesale Club MasterCard); Kerry Capell et al., Dunned if You Do, Dunned if You Don't, 
Bus. WK., Sep. 23, 1996, at 130 (noting that sixty-four percent of credit card users carry a balance). See 
also Albert B. Crenshaw, Ending a Free Ride; Credit Card Finn Plans Fee if Balance is Paid Monthly, 
WASH. PosT., Sep. 11, 1996, at F1 (reporting one company's claims that credit cardholders who pay their 
balances in full cost the company $30 annually whereas the company earns $318 annually on customers 
who carry a balance). 
147See Jennifer Babson, Credit-Card Debt N.ot a Liability in 'This Mar~et, BosTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 
1999, at F1 (noting that credit-card companies refer to card holders who do not carry monthly balances as 
~deadbeats~ and ~in some cases have slapped annual fees on those who refuse to revolve their debt.~); 
Patrick Lee, GE to 'Tac~ on $25 Fee to Cardholders Who Pay Off 'Their Balances Promptly, Los ANGELES 
TIMES, Sep. 11, 1996 (Business; Financial Desk), at D1 (reporting that GE Capital Services' Rewards 
MasterCard will affix a $25 annual charge to customer accounts that don't carry a balance from month to 
month or incur less than $25 in annual charges); Cf. Carol Frey, Ban~s Put Squeeze on Prompt Card-
Holders, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), June 12, 1999, at D1 (discussing other methods credit-card 
firms use to turn ~unprofitable, zero-balance customers into finance-charge payers~). 
Indeed, it appears that credit card companies intentionally seek customers who they know will spend 
more than their means because those customers are optimal customers. See REPORT, supra note 98, at 94 
(discussing study which found debtors who previously filed for bankruptcy ~are attractive to some credit 
issuers because they have shown they will take on credit and, by law, they cannot seek a bankruptcy 
discharge for another six years.~); In re Hernandez, 208 B.R. 872, 879 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) r[T]he 
same industry that seeks customers who will spend more than their means requests that discharge be 
denied to these customers because of an implied promise (which courts must infer) not to spend more than 
their means.~). 
148But cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, Comnwn Sense Consumer Ban~ptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L. ]. 461, 466, 
477-82 {1997) (proposing bankruptcy system that removes perverse incentives for irresponsible lending 
and shift penalties to credit industry). 
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care and transportation assistance to benefit recipients, 149 none of the current 
or proposed debtor education programs are designed to help debtors obtain 
more marketable job skills, health insurance, or help them collect child sup-
port payments.150 
Even if Congress mandated that debtors receive this "lifestyle counsel-
ing,'" it is unclear who should give this counseling. As one commentator ar-
gued over twenty years ago in response to debtor counseling programs, it 
probably makes "scant economic sense to substitute a useless counselor for a 
lawyer."'151 Moreover, paying outside credit counselors to advise debtors, 
hiring employment specialists to provide job training services, helping debtors 
secure adequate health insurance, or helping the debtor collect child support 
payments will be expensive.152 However, unless and until the bankruptcy 
system addresses the underlying causes for the economic plight facing the 
modern debtor, adopting a quick fix like means-testing will solve only the 
immediate problem of increased consumer filings. It will do nothing to solve 
debtors' chronic financial difficulties or to prevent them from needing to file 
for bankruptcy again in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Making bankruptcy a means-tested public assistance program is not, in 
principle, an irrational idea. Imposing a means-test that restricts bankruptcy 
relief to those who can document a financial need is consistent with the types 
of restrictions Congress imposes on the recipients of nonentitlement public 
assistance benefits. Similarly, using a means-test to stigmatize debtors and 
force them to modify their behavior is consistent with the role stigma played 
during welfare reform debates. A reasonable means-test can prevent truly 
undeserving poor debtors from discharging their debts, just as means-testing 
prevents the undeserving poor from receiving certain welfare benefits. More-
over, if bankruptcy is means-tested, then in return for providing an indirect 
cash benefit, this system reasonably can impose this country's economic val-
ues on the benefit recipients. In short, means-testing bankruptcy certainly 
149See 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(1) and 618(a). 
15
°For example, while the planning skills component of one Chapter 13 debtor education program 
covers career as well as financial planning and the communication skills component introduces techniques 
to help solve personal, family, and career problems, the program does not help debtors get a better job, 
improve their educational level, etc. REPORT, supra note 98, at Appendix G·3.b. 
151Rendleman, supra note 119, at 1232. 
ISZSee, e.g., Statement of the Hon. William H. Brown: At a Hearing on H.R 833 Before the Subcommit· 
tee on Commercial & Administrative Law House Committee on the judiciary, March 17, 1999 (statement 
on behalf of the American Bankruptcy Institute) (visited Aug. 5, 1999) <http://www.abiworld.org/legis/ 
testimony/brown.html> (commenting that required credit counseling ~would add to the cost of bank· 
ruptcy relief' and that ~[ e ]xisting counseling services would be burdened by the need to brief and counsel 
individuals who have no likelihood of being able to pay their debts through a voluntary repayment plan.~). 
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can be justified as being consistent with the treatment Congress has given 
other recipients of nonentitlement federal assistance. 
Though bankruptcy is not called a public assistance program, it nonethe-
less has served (and hopefully will continue to serve) as a social safety net for 
overburdened debtors. Supporters of the current bankruptcy reforms suggest 
that the net is being removed from greedy debtors, but that it will remain in 
place for needy debtors. Unfortunately, removing that safety net by telling 
all debtors that they should repay their debts, and by making it hard for all 
debtors to discharge any debts, inevitably will harm some needy debtors. 
Moreover, at least with respect to debtors who file for bankruptcy relief 
because of income shocks caused by unexpected life changes, the proposed 
reforms will neither necessarily decrease the number of those filings nor cause 
those types of debtors to repay more of their bills. If debtors truly lack the 
ability to consistently pay their debts due to medical expenses, divorce ex-
penses or expenses created by a job termination or restructure, telling them 
that they should try to repay their debts will not then cause those debts to 
be repaid. Instead, imposing a means test that prevents truly needy debtors 
from discharging debts will serve the goal of decreasing the number of filings 
but will do nothing to decrease the need to file. Since Congress is determined 
to make bankruptcy a means-tested system, if it really wants to decrease the 
need to file, the reformed system must also give debtors the skills needed to 
avoid the economic crises that caused them to seek to discharge their debts in 
the first place. 
